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ABSTRACT
This paper is the first empirical analysis of appeal waivers—
clauses in plea agreements by which defendants waive their rights to
appellate and postconviction review. Based on interviews and an
analysis of data coded from 971 randomly selected cases sentenced
under the United States Sentencing Guidelines, the study’s findings
include (1) in nearly two-thirds of the cases settled by plea agreement,
the defendants waived their rights to review; (2) the frequency of
waiver varies substantially among the circuits, and among districts
within circuits; (3) the government appears to provide some
sentencing concessions more frequently to defendants who sign
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waivers than to defendants who do not, including agreeing to “C”
pleas (binding sentencing terms), downward departures, safety-valve
credits, and a variety of stipulations; (4) many defendants who waive
their rights to review obtain clauses in their agreements that limit their
exposure to unexpected negative results at sentencing; (5) some
defendants appear to receive neither greater certainty nor leniency in
return for signing wide-open and unlimited waivers of their rights to
review; (6) three-quarters of the defendants who waived appeal also
waived collateral review, and of these, fewer than one-third preserved
the right to raise a claim of ineffective assistance; and (7) waivers have
been enforced to bar a variety of claims, including claims of
ineffective assistance at sentencing and assertions of constitutional
violations under Blakely and Booker. The observed trend of
increased use of stipulations combined with no review raises the risk
that sentences not in compliance with the law can proliferate without
scrutiny. The uneven practice of trading sentencing concessions for
waivers among cases and courts also suggests that waivers are
undercutting efforts to advance consistency in federal sentencing.
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INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Blakely v.
Washington1 and United States v. Booker2 have disrupted presumptive

1.
2.

124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004).
125 S. Ct. 738 (2005).
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sentencing systems in the federal courts and in several states,
prompting a level of activity in sentencing reform that this country
has not seen for three decades. As new sentencing policy takes shape,
information about the successes and failures of various sentencing
practices will be in demand. One particular practice—appellate
review—is likely to remain a popular means of advancing sentencing
3
consistency. This Article examines one potential limitation of
appellate review as a means of regulating sentencing: clauses in plea
agreements by which defendants waive their rights to appellate and
postconviction review of sentencing errors, known as appeal waivers.
For well over a decade, anecdotal evidence has suggested that
appeal waivers have become increasingly frequent in federal cases.
Scholars and litigants disagree about what is waived, by whom, at
what price, and how often. In every circuit, litigation challenging the
enforcement of appeal waivers has raised conflicting claims about
their drawbacks and benefits. Recent decisions embracing broad
appeal waivers have continued to provoke criticism from
4
commentators. And the Supreme Court has yet to rule on their
validity. Yet despite this sustained controversy, in the seventeen-year
history of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (Guidelines), no
empirical examination of sentencing appeal waivers in federal cases
has ever been conducted. Our study was undertaken to present a
snapshot of the use and impact of appeal waivers in cases sentenced
under the Guidelines in the hope that the findings will prompt further
research and better inform evolving sentencing policy.

3. See, e.g., Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 767 (noting that Congress strongly favors the “retention
of sentencing appeals” to “iron out sentencing differences”); Implications of the Booker/Fanfan
Decision for the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime,
Terrorism, and Homeland Sec., House Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 14 (2005)
(statement of the Honorable Christopher A. Wray, Assistant Att’y Gen., Criminal Div., U.S.
Dep’t of Justice) [hereinafter Wray], available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/getdoc.cgi? dbname=109_house_hearings&docid=98624 (“A rigorous and consistent
appellate standard is essential to any guideline system since appellate review will be an
important means for the parties to obtain consistent sentencing.”).
4. See, e.g., Sentencing Law and Policy, Appeal Waivers in the Wake of Booker,
http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/2005/04/appeal_waivers_.html (Apr.
27, 2005, 17:17 EST) (“[I]t is against public policy to let prosecutors and defendants completely
opt-out of appellate review. . . . [D]istrict courts post-Booker should reconsider the
appropriateness of accepting pleas with broad appeal waivers.”); see also Spann v. State, 704
N.W.2d 486, 494–95 (Minn. 2005) (refusing to uphold a waiver of appeal rights in a posttrial
agreement, noting that “[a]llowing a defendant to waive his right to appeal creates a system that
discourages the development of the law, permits the results of unfair trials to be preserved, and
may encourage prosecutors and courts to hide their errors”).
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To collect basic information about appeal waiver practice in
federal felony cases, we turned to two sources. First, we conducted
open-ended interviews of twenty-two defense attorneys and nine
5
prosecutors in thirteen different districts. The districts were selected
to represent every circuit, as well as small, medium, and large
caseloads. They also include some “border districts,” where
bargaining practices reportedly differ from other districts in certain
types of cases. Second, with the cooperation of the United States
Sentencing Commission (Commission), we coded information from
971 cases randomly selected from among those sentenced in fiscal
year 2003 (FY 2003) with written plea agreements.6
In brief, our most important findings demonstrate the following:
the rate at which plea-based sentences are appealed declined
somewhat over the period between the adoption of sentencing appeal
waivers (in the early- to mid-1990s) and 2003. In nearly two-thirds of
the cases settled by plea agreement in our sample, the defendant
waived his right to review. The frequency of waivers varies
substantially among the circuits, and among districts within circuits.
Immigration cases in our sample were more likely to contain waivers
than drug trafficking cases, and both were more likely to contain
waivers than firearms cases.
The United States rarely waived its rights to appeal; usually only
the defendant waived his review rights. In the plea agreements we
examined, the government appears to have provided some sentencing
concessions more frequently to those defendants who signed waivers
7
than to those who did not. These concessions included “C pleas,”
8
9
downward departures, safety-valve credits, and a variety of
stipulations to facts that determined sentences under the

5. Our interviewees are identified only by role (defender or prosecutor); to protect
confidentiality, districts and other identifying information are not provided. Professor King
conducted the interviews between August 2004 and May 2005 by telephone, and each lasted
about thirty minutes. A sample of the open-ended questions posed to each interviewee is on file
with the Duke Law Journal.
6. We originally selected 1,000 cases from among those coded by the Commission as
including a written agreement of some sort in the file. See infra note 70 and accompanying text.
Cases with no written plea agreements were omitted. Once the coding of the agreements was
complete, we combined the data that we coded from our sample cases with other information
about these cases that was included in the Commission’s FY 2003 data.
7. A C plea is a guilty plea under subsection (C) of Rule 11(c)(1) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure.
8. See infra note 38 and accompanying text.
9. See infra note 39 and accompanying text.
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Guidelines—facts that would normally be determined by judges at
sentencing. Many defendants who waived their rights to review
obtained clauses in their agreements that limited their exposure to
unexpected negative results at sentencing.
Our preliminary study also corroborates some concerns raised by
critics of appeal waivers. Some defendants in our study appear to
have received neither greater certainty in sentencing nor leniency in
return for waiving all rights to review. Three-quarters of the
defendants in our sample who waived appeal also waived collateral
review; of these, fewer than one-third preserved the right to raise a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Waivers have been enforced
to bar a variety of claims, including claims of ineffective assistance at
sentencing and assertions of constitutional violations under Blakely
and Booker. The increased use of stipulations, combined with waiver
of review, increases the risk that sentences not in compliance with the
law will proliferate without scrutiny. The uneven practice among
cases and courts of trading sentencing concessions for waivers also
suggests that waivers are undercutting efforts to advance consistency
in federal sentencing.
I. APPELLATE REVIEW OF FEDERAL SENTENCING
Appellate review became part of modern sentencing policy in the
1970s and 1980s. Previously, under indeterminate sentencing, federal
trial judges rarely spelled out factual findings or gave reasons for their
sentences. Courts of appeals reviewed trial court compliance with the
rules that governed sentencing procedure, but those rules were
relatively uncomplicated. A sentence was virtually unreviewable so
long as the penalty imposed was on the menu of punishments that
Congress had authorized for the offense.10
In the 1960s and 1970s, with equal treatment of similarly situated
offenders high on social and legal agendas and with crime rates
11
soaring, reformers took aim at the enormous power exercised by

10. See Kevin R. Reitz, Sentencing Guideline Systems and Sentence Appeals: A Comparison
of Federal and State Experiences, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1441, 1443–47 (1997) (describing the lack of
meaningful appellate review of sentencing decisions in state and federal courts prior to 1980).
11. Compare FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME
REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATES 61 tbl.2 (1973) (noting 285,980 violent crimes in the United
States in 1960), with FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM
CRIME REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATES 41 tbl.2 (1981) (noting 1,308,900 violent crimes in
the United States in 1980).
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judges and parole boards to discriminate among offenders in
allocating punishment. This flexibility, reformers worried, had
12
resulted in both unwarranted leniency and arbitrary punishment. By
the 1980s, the federal government and several states had subdivided
statutory sentence ranges that spanned decades into multiple, smaller
ranges of limited months.13 Movement within or between ranges was
carefully regulated and made contingent upon the presence or
absence of designated information about the offender or offense. In
these presumptive sentencing systems, only acceptable factors could
enter the sentencing calculus. Judges were forbidden to sentence
using extralegal factors such as race, gender, or unique local norms
for punishment.14 In the federal system, the Sentencing Reform Act of
1984, with its new guidelines for sentencing, promised to “control the
effects of philosophical differences among judges and varying local
conditions.”15 Parole was abandoned because it was perceived as
failing in its missions to reduce crime, distinguish reformed convicts
from potential recidivists, and administer release decisions equitably
and predictably.16 Reformers hoped that this reduction in sentencing
discretion would advance not only the equality of punishment, but
17
also its certainty.
The glue holding these new presumptive sentencing systems
together was appellate review. Prosecutors could appeal if a judge
sentenced a defendant to a sentence lower than the law provided,
12. See, e.g., ANTHONY PARTRIDGE & WILLIAM B. ELDRIDGE, THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SENTENCING STUDY: A REPORT TO THE JUDGES OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT 5 (1974) (reporting
a disparity in mock and actual sentencings, including one case in which sentences by different
judges for the same case ranged from three to twenty years); Brian Forst & Charles Wellford,
Punishment and Sentencing: Developing Sentencing Guidelines Empirically from Principles of
Punishment, 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 799, 808–14 (1981) (reporting a disparity in mock
sentencings, including nine out of sixteen scenarios in which some judges recommended twentyyear sentences while others recommended no imprisonment).
13. See generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 26.3, at 1210–14
(3d ed. 2000) (describing the movement from indeterminate to determinate sentencing systems).
14. Id.
15. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINES SENTENCING 93 (2004),
available at http://www.ussc.gov/15_year/15_year_study_full.pdf [hereinafter FIFTEEN-YEAR
REPORT]; see also William W. Wilkins, Jr. & John R. Steer, The Role of Sentencing Guideline
Amendments in Reducing Unwarranted Sentencing Disparity, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 63, 87
(1993) (“No purpose was more important to Congress and the several Administrations that
worked for years to enact the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 than the avoidance of
unwarranted disparity and resulting unfairness in the sentencing of similarly situated
defendants.”).
16. S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 40, 56–58, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3223, 3239–41.
17. Id.
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defendants could appeal to make sure judges did not exceed
authorized sentences, and both could appeal violations of sentencing
18
procedures. Appellate review of sentencing emerged as the primary
enforcement mechanism for sentencing reform in federal courts as
19
well as in the courts of more than a dozen states. Appellate judges
would also participate in developing the scope and meaning of the
Guidelines provisions in an ongoing dialogue with the Commission
about fair process and just punishment.20
Appellate review has served these goals, but not as well as
reformers had hoped. Thousands of appellate cases have helped to
define the permissible application and scope of hundreds of
provisions in the Guidelines, ranging from those determining when
sentence increases are warranted by a defendant’s criminal history, to
those determining when a judge may depart upwards or downwards
21
from the recommended sentencing ranges. The Commission has
monitored appellate decisions to determine when to propose
Guidelines amendments.22 The Supreme Court itself has resolved
23
over a dozen disputes about the Guidelines. But over the years, the
consistency of appellate review—so central to controlling disparity
under the Guidelines—has been undercut by three developments.
First, parties have manipulated the application of the Guidelines
through stipulations, expressly resolving sentencing facts and
Guidelines “scoring” questions as part of the plea agreement. When

18. See Reitz, supra note 10, at 1451–57 (stating that appellate review in a guidelines
system should perform two functions: (1) enforcement—that is, making sure that judges apply
the law, and (2) law making—that is, defining the meaning of terms in statutes and creating a
common law of departures).
19. See generally Reitz, supra note 10 (reviewing the rise of appellate review). For a
sampling of scholarship advocating appellate review of sentencing, see AM. LAW INST., MODEL
PENAL CODE: SENTENCING REPORT 56 (Kevin R. Reitz reporter, 2003), available at
http://www.ali.org/ali/ALIPROJ_MPC03.pdf; Albert W. Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing
Guidelines: A Plea for Less Aggregation, 4 FED. SENT’G REP. 161, 164 (1991); Douglas A.
Berman, A Common Law for This Age of Federal Sentencing: The Opportunity and Need for
Judicial Lawmaking, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 93 (1999); Norval Morris, Towards Principled
Sentencing, 37 MD. L. REV. 267, 284–86 (1977); Steven E. Zipperstein, Certain Uncertainty:
Appellate Review and the Sentencing Guidelines, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 621 (1992).
20. Reitz, supra note 10, at 1455.
21. See Reitz, supra note 10, at 1466 (terming federal appellate review “high
enforcement/low judicial creativity”).
22. Wilkins & Steer, supra note 15, at 76–81.
23. See generally JEFRI WOOD, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., GUIDELINE SENTENCING, AN
OUTLINE OF APPELLATE CASELAW ON SELECTED ISSUES (2002) (outlining significant
developments in federal court decisions on the Guidelines).
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the Guidelines first assigned a specific punishment price to each fact,
“fact bargaining”—long a component of the criminal justice system—
assumed added importance. Defendants and the government could
anticipate, with greater certainty, which facts might best be tied down
24
in the agreement to obtain specific sentence reductions. A change to
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure in 1999 made this
easier still. It authorized parties to enter into not only a plea
agreement that is conditioned upon the court’s acceptance of a
negotiated sentence, but also plea agreements conditioned upon the
court’s acceptance of a negotiated sentence range or sentencing
factor.25 The result was even more “buried” deals and virtually no
appellate review of stipulations.26
Admittedly, Congress and the Commission did see this coming.27
Probation officers were enlisted to provide objective factual
information that judges could rely upon to determine the “real” story.
The Commission warned parties not to “stipulate to misleading or
non-existent facts,” but instead to “fully disclose the actual facts and
then explain to the court the reasons why the disposition of the case

24. See, e.g., Berthoff v. United States, 140 F. Supp. 2d 50, 62 n.19 (D. Mass. 2001), aff’d
308 F.3d 124 (1st Cir. 2002) (defining “fact bargaining” as “the knowing abandonment by the
government of a material fact developed by law enforcement authorities or from a witness
expected to testify in order to induce a guilty plea”); see also Douglas Berman, Is Fact
Bargaining Undermining the Guidelines?, 8 FED. SENT’G REP. 300, 300 (1996) (“[F]act
bargaining may simply be the process by which parties seeking to strike plea agreements create
certainty in the guideline calculation.”).
25. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1)(C). Opponents of the 1999 amendment argued that it would
“allow parties to agree to offense characteristics regardless of the actual facts . . . found in the
Pre-Sentencing Report. . . . [T]he primary danger is allowing parties to bind the court to certain
facts, thus taking away more of the court’s discretionary authority and shifting it to the
prosecutor’s office.” Memorandum from Professor Dave Schlueter, Reporter, to Members,
Advisory Committee on Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Comments on Proposed
Amendments to Rule 11, at 3 (Mar. 23, 1998) [hereinafter Schlueter Memo] (on file with the
Duke Law Journal). Opponents also worried that parties would “circumvent the guidelines” to
reach agreement, and that probation officers’ assessments would be bypassed. Id. at 5.
26. For example, as one district court held:
The district judge can stop this practice, of course, by refusing to accept the plea—but
will he? Maybe not, if the agreed sentence accords with the judge’s personal sense of
justice. After all, there will never be any appeal so the matter is beyond review. No
downward departure will ever be reported, and the case will be resolved simply,
finally, and completely.
United States v. Green, 346 F. Supp. 2d 259, 277 (D. Mass. 2004).
27. The Sentencing Reform Act, a Senate Report assured, provided that the Commission
should issue policy statements to “assure that judges can examine plea agreements to make
certain that prosecutors have not used plea bargaining to undermine the sentencing guidelines.”
S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 52 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3246.
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should differ from that which such facts ordinarily would require
28
under the guidelines.” Judges were instructed not to “rely
exclusively upon stipulations in ascertaining the factors relevant to
29
the determination of sentence.” The Attorney General, too, ordered
prosecutors to argue for the application of only those charges and
factors supported by the facts and not to negotiate facts.30
But in many districts, bargaining over sentencing factors has
continued.31 Busy trial judges have little incentive to reject stipulations
by the parties. In some districts, probation officers do not disturb
stipulations, and in any event they are rarely asked for their opinion
until after the plea deal is accepted.32 As the Second Circuit admitted
recently, “It will ordinarily not be necessary for the court taking the
plea to question a defendant specifically about each factual
stipulation . . . . [F]acts admitted in a plea agreement can, and usually
33
will, be accepted by the sentencing court as true.” The four Supreme
Court Justices dissenting in United States v. Booker concluded that
fact bargaining is “quite common under the current system.”34 Writing
for the majority, Justice Breyer admitted that the “system has not
worked perfectly; judges have often simply accepted an agreed-upon
28. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 6B1.4 cmt. (2004).
29. Id.; see also FIFTEEN-YEAR REPORT, supra note 15, at 27–32 (discussing the
administration of guideline sentencing, including procedures for transparent plea agreements
and reliable fact-finding).
30. Memorandum from John Ashcroft, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to All Fed.
Prosecutors (Sept. 22, 2003), available at http://www.crimelynx.com/ashchargememo.html
[hereinafter Ashcroft Memo]; Memorandum from Richard Thornburgh, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t
of Justice, to All Fed. Prosecutors (Mar. 13, 1989), reprinted in 6 FED. SENT’G REP. 347, 347
(1994) (directing federal prosecutors to “charge the most serious, readily provable offense or
offenses consistent with defendant’s conduct”).
31. See FIFTEEN-YEAR REPORT, supra note 15, at 92 (concluding that “[a]lthough a lack of
data raises a serious obstacle to quantitative research, a variety of evidence suggests that
disparate treatment of similar offenders is common at presentencing stages”); id. at 88–92
(discussing the limitations of existing research and concluding that more research is “sorely
needed”). Some are convinced that the expectation that the judiciary could control
prosecutorial manipulation of the Guidelines “has proved utterly in vain.” Green, 346 F. Supp.
2d at 268; see KATE STITH & JOSE CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING 89–90 (1998) (describing the
adversarial nature of fact-finding in the sentencing process).
32. According to some research, “[i]n a significant number of districts, probation officers
reported that the court would usually or nearly always defer to the plea agreement when it
conflicted with information in the presentence report.” FIFTEEN-YEAR REPORT, supra note 15,
at 86. Other research found that the vast majority of district judges and probation officers
reported that agreements contained stipulated facts, and a significant percentage indicated that
these stipulations understated the offense conduct. Id.
33. United States v. Granik, 386 F.3d 404, 413 (2d Cir. 2004).
34. United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 782 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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35
account of the conduct at issue.” A recent Commission report, too,
concluded that “surveys . . ., field research . . ., and analysis of
information provided to the Commission in presentence reports have
suggested that uneven charging and plea bargaining undermine the
guidelines and result in sentencing disparity in a substantial number
of cases.”36 Furthermore, “[r]ejection of plea agreements that
undermine the guidelines, though not unknown, appears to have been
37
relatively rare throughout the guidelines era.”
Second, appellate review as a means to control sentencing
disparity has been weakened by federal law exempting from judicial
review decisions by prosecutors to (1) grant a downward departure
for the defendant’s substantial assistance in investigating or
38
prosecuting another, (2) file a safety-valve motion for a sentence
below the statutory minimum sentence,39 (3) seek a reduced sentence
40
under Rule 35, or (4) subtract a third point for acceptance of
41
responsibility. These rules have meant that the decisions to select
certain defendants for special treatment—and to determine the extent
42
of the discount provided—have rested entirely with prosecutors. The

35. Id. at 762 (Breyer, J., for the Court).
36. FIFTEEN-YEAR REPORT, supra note 15, at 141.
37. Id. at 144.
38. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1 (2004) (authorizing, upon
government motion, a lower sentence for a defendant providing substantial assistance in the
investigation or prosecution of another person).
39. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e)–(f) (2000) (providing authority for imposing a sentence below
the mandatory minimum sentence upon government motion and substantial assistance in the
investigation or prosecution of another).
40. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 35(b) (providing authority for a court to reduce a defendant’s
sentence below the mandatory minimum upon government motion and substantial assistance in
the investigation and prosecution of another).
41. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1 (2004) (providing for up to a
three-point reduction in a defendant’s offense level for the defendant’s acceptance of
responsibility); Margareth Etienne, Acceptance of Responsibility and Plea Bargaining Under the
Feeney Amendment, 16 FED. SENT’G REP. 109, 110 (2004) (discussing the possible effects of the
Feeney Amendment, which authorized prosecutors to determine eligibility for the third point).
42. Assistant Attorney General Christopher Wray explained:
[I]t is essential that the Department retain control over whether consideration at
sentencing will be given for cooperation. Cooperation agreements are an essential
component of law enforcement and are necessary to penetrate criminal organizations
and to obtain convictions in court. First, the Department is in the best position to
evaluate the truthfulness and value of a cooperator’s assistance, by evaluating it
within the context of the entire body of investigative information and by determining
whether it is consistent and corroborated by other evidence. But there is a more
important reason—the Department needs the leverage in order to insist that
cooperating defendants testify to the complete truth, rather than half-truths.
Wray, supra note 3, at 15.
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latest research shows “irregular and inconsistent policies and
practices among the various districts” for employing departures for
substantial assistance and that similar variations plague Rule 35(b)
43
motions as well. The Booker Court’s decision to make all Guidelines
provisions advisory rather than mandatory, including guidelines
governing departures for substantial assistance and acceptance of
responsibility, has arguably relegated the government’s control over
these adjustments to mere suggestions. Nevertheless, judges after
Booker must find a reasonable basis for disregarding these
Guidelines. And judges continue to be powerless to disregard the
government’s preferences regarding reductions below mandatory
minimum penalties using either the safety valve or Rule 35.44
Finally, clauses in plea agreements by which parties waive appeal
rights have undercut the ability of appellate review to regulate
inconsistent sentencing practices. Agreements to forego review of the
sentence and the sentencing process have the potential to disable the
tools for regulating sentencing discretion that remain after Booker, as
well as those that are being created in Booker’s wake. The remainder
of this Article is devoted to an examination of appeal waivers and
their effects.
II. THE APPEAL WAIVER DEBATE
Waivers were a consequence of the explosion in the number of
criminal appeals after the Guidelines went into effect.45 Prior to the
Guidelines, once a defendant entered a guilty plea, there was little to
appeal. Because defendants waived most pretrial and trial rights when
pleading guilty, and because sentencing appeals were futile, criminal
appeals were primarily reserved for those few defendants who were
convicted after trial. But the new sentencing statutes and the
Guidelines changed that. The Guidelines provided hundreds of new
sentencing issues for defendants to raise on appeal, even after

43. FIFTEEN-YEAR REPORT, supra note 15, at 103–06.
44. Pending legislation would increase even further prosecutorial power regarding safetyvalve reductions. See H.R. 1528, 109th Cong. §§ 2, 3, 6 (2005) (seeking to amend 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(f)).
45. See Catherine M. Goodwin, Summary: 1996 Committee on Criminal Law Memo on
Waivers of Appeal and Advisement of the Right to Appeal, 10 FED. SENT’G REP. 212, 212, 214
n.2 (1998) (predicting an increase in appeal waivers due to the high number of appeals and
other factors).
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pleading guilty. The hope of avoiding these sorts of challenges
motivated prosecutors to include appeal waivers in plea agreements.
Appeal waivers appeared early in the Fourth Circuit, which held
them enforceable in the early 1990s, and in border districts with
46
unprecedented numbers of illegal reentry cases. Under so-called
47
fast-track programs, prosecutors in 1995 began to allow defendants
who pled guilty early to obtain a much lower sentence, often through
prosecutors’ agreements to drop or not to add a charge, so long as the
defendant agreed in return to waive everything including the right to
appeal.48
46. E.g., United States v. Melancon, 972 F.2d 566, 567–68 (5th Cir. 1992); United States v.
Navarro-Botello, 912 F.2d 318, 321 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Wiggins, 905 F.2d 51, 52–53
(4th Cir. 1990).
47. See FIFTEEN-YEAR REPORT, supra note 15, at 34 (discussing fast-track programs).
48. This fast-track system for trafficking and immigration cases was eventually upheld by
the Ninth Circuit in 1995 and later authorized by Congress. See United States v. Estrada-Plata,
57 F.3d 757, 761 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding “absolutely nothing wrong with (and, quite frankly, a
great deal right) with” the fast-track policy); see also The PROTECT Act of 2003, Pub. L. No.
108-21, § 401(m)(2)(B), 117 Stat. 650, 675 (2003) (instructing the Commission to issue a policy
statement authorizing an early disposition program); Government’s Memorandum of Law in
Opposition to the Defendant’s Motion for a Non-Guideline Sentence Based on the Existence of
Fast-Track Programs 2–8, United States v. Krukowski, No. 04 Cr. 1308 (2d Cir. June 10, 2005),
available
at
http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/files/61005_govt_
opposition_to_sg_variance_due_to_fasttrack.pdf [hereinafter Government’s Memo] (tracing the
history of fast-track programs and noting that entitlement to fast-track departures or
concessions requires waiver of the rights to file any pretrial motions, appeal, or seek review
under 28 U.S.C. § 2255). The PROTECT Act limited judicial discretion to depart below the
Guidelines sentence, but specifically authorized departures in accordance with fast-track
programs—at least those fast-track programs authorized by the Attorney General.
§ 401(m)(2)(B). The Commission soon adopted a policy statement on fast-track provisions. U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K3 (2004); see also id. at app. C, amend. 651 (issuing a
policy statement effective October 27, 2003). One of the requirements for fast-track approval by
the Attorney General is that the district must require each defendant “to waive appeal” and “to
waive the opportunity to challenge his or her conviction under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, except on the
issue of ineffective assistance of counsel.” Memorandum Regarding Dep’t Principles for
Implementing an Expedited Disposition or Fast-Track Prosecution Program in a District, from
John Ashcroft, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to All United States Attorneys (Sept. 22, 2003)
[hereinafter Fast-Track Memo], available at http://www.crimelynx.com/fasttrack.html.
Interviewees also commented on the link between fast-track cases and the origins of appeal
waivers. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Defender #15 (stating that waivers started “seven to
ten years [ago] . . . in immigration [fast-track cases]”). As one defender noted:
Where they first started was in a category of cases: mule cases. These are cases where
you have very low level drug couriers. . . . [O]ur district adopted a policy because of
volume, and maybe because everybody recognized the sentences were inappropriate
for these people, who are more like victims themselves, that let you plead to an
amount that carried a sentence of zero to twenty rather than the ten to life. They just
did it on their own, justified on the basis of volume. . . . That policy has existed almost
twenty years, and we started to see appeal waivers there first. As a condition for
getting this, appeal waiver crept in . . . . We were pissed off when it began, but frankly
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Once appeal waivers caught on in the Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth
Circuits, they soon took hold elsewhere. Prosecutors loved them.
Recalled one prosecutor, “We were spending attorney resources on
appeals [in cases that] we eventually won. We have in the office only
generalists; our trial attorneys do their own appellate briefs. A couple
big appeals per year can hurt your indictment productivity.”49 By the
end of 1995, six additional courts of appeals had upheld the validity of
appeal waivers, and United States Attorneys received a memo from
Washington encouraging them to consider whether the employment
50
of appeal waivers would be a “useful addition” in their districts.
At roughly the same time, Congress was considering limiting
collateral relief for federal prisoners under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Federal
prisoners who pleaded guilty not only could appeal their sentences,
but they also retained access to § 2255 for claims such as breach of the
plea agreement, ineffective assistance of counsel, failure of the
prosecutor to disclose exculpatory evidence, some double jeopardy
violations, and the unconstitutionality of the statute defining the
51
defendant’s offense. Waiver clauses in plea agreements were
modified to bar this sort of collateral review as well.52
But it was not only prosecutors who supported appeal waivers.
53
Many judges encouraged them too. In 1995, in response to a Federal

from the prosecutor’s point of view it made lots of sense. You are giving up the store.
Then it spread to everything.
Telephone Interview with Defender #9.
49. Telephone Interview with Prosecutor #1; see, e.g., Telephone Interview with Defender
#14 (“They finally saw from other districts that this was a very effective thing to cut down on
what they saw were frivolous appeals.”); Telephone Interview with Defender #15 (“I think they
started here because they have a relatively small appellate division . . . . The guys running it
adopted a rule that if you didn’t have an appeal waiver you had to write your own appeal. There
were only [a small number of] lawyers doing all the appellate work, they just decided to do this,
after hearing about it nationally.”); Telephone Interview with Defender #21 (“[Prosecutors
started asking for waivers] [b]ecause they’re lazy. [They] don’t want to do their work. My
friends in the United States Attorney’s office at the time told me . . . they were tired of
people . . . filing baseless claims, and they didn’t want to fool with them.”).
50. Memorandum from John C. Keeney, Acting Asst. Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to
All United States Attorneys (Oct. 4, 1995), reprinted in 10 FED. SENT’G REP. 209, 209 (1998)
[hereinafter Keeney Memo].
51. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 13, at § 21.6(a) (synthesizing the law regarding the
rights waived or forfeited by a plea).
52. See Anup Malani, Habeas Settlements 28–32 (Univ. of Va. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal
Theory Working Paper Series, Paper No. 7, 2004), available at http://law.bepress.com/
uvalwps/uva_publiclaw/art7 (tracing the rise of “habeas waivers”).
53. See Lynn Fant & Ronit Walker, Reflections on a Hobson’s Choice: Appellate Waivers
and Sentencing Guidelines, 11 FED. SENT’G REP. 60, 60 (1998) (“From an examination of the
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Judicial Center survey on the Guidelines sent to over 1,100 of the
1,189 federal district and circuit judges, 67 percent of district judges
who responded and 62 percent of responding circuit judges agreed
54
that “[w]aivers of appeal should be used more frequently.” In 1996,
judges from the Committee on Criminal Law of the Judicial
Conference proposed that Federal Rule 11 be amended specifically to
require the court to discuss with defendants any term in a plea
agreement that waives the right to appeal or collateral attack.55 This
change, it was argued, would not only better inform defendants, it
56
would “help protect any appeal waivers against reversal.”
Opponents viewed the proposed amendment as an invitation to
adopt waiver provisions that were unconstitutional, unnecessary, and
57
unwise. Waivers are unconstitutional, opponents first argued,
spate of opinions upholding appellate waivers in almost every circumstance, however, it appears
that the courts of appeals want to limit their participation in the sentencing game.”). In United
States v. McGilvery, 403 F.3d 361, 363 (6th Cir. 2005), after finding that the waiver clause barred
appeal, including any Booker claim, the Sixth Circuit stated:
The Court and the parties have unnecessarily devoted substantial time and resources
on this appeal. In order to avoid similar situations in the future, we strongly
encourage the government to promptly file a motion to dismiss the defendant’s
appeal where the defendant waived his appellate rights as part of a plea agreement,
and to attach a copy of the appellate-waiver provision and the transcript of the plea
colloquy showing the district court’s compliance with Rule 11(b)(1)(N). Once the
defendant responds, the matter can then be referred to a motions panel for
disposition.
54. MOLLY TREADWAY JOHNSON & SCOTT A. GILBERT, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., THE U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES, RESULTS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER’S 1996 SURVEY,
REPORT TO THE COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL LAW OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES 22 tbl.14 (1997). Judges were also given the opportunity to agree or disagree
with the following statement: “Waivers of appeal should be used less frequently.” Thirty percent
of the district judges and 24 percent of the circuit judges agreed. Id. Our interviewees also
reported that district judges appreciated waivers. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Defender
#12 (“[T]he judges like ‘em, because their decisions don’t get reviewed by anybody.”);
Telephone Interview with Defender #14 (“Newer judges really do like [the appeal waivers].”);
Telephone Interview with Defender #15 (“[Judges] kinda like them. They won’t get reversed.
This is how they keep score in their lives.”); Telephone Interview with Prosecutor #4 (“These
district court judges carry the same docket, they want to get rid of these cases just like we do.”).
55. See Minutes of the Advisory Comm. on the Fed. Rules of Criminal Procedure, at 4
(Oct. 7–8, 1996), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/cr10-796.htm.
56. Goodwin, supra note 45, at 213. Many of the practitioners interviewed mentioned trial
bench support for appeal waivers. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Defender #6 (“The judges
have not tried to change the appeal waivers. They are standard operating procedure. . . . It’s just
routine, [a]ccepted by everybody as part of the deal.”); see also infra notes 84 & 124 and
accompanying text.
57. See Schlueter Memo, supra note 25 (“A majority of the commentators addressing this
amendment . . . are opposed to [it]. The general view is that this provision will signal an
approval of such provisions before the Supreme Court has had an opportunity to settle the
question of whether such a provision is constitutional.”).
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because there could be no knowing waiver of potential future errors
that might occur at a proceeding that had yet to take place. Because
sentencing had yet to take place, defendants could not possibly know
and the judge at the plea proceeding could not describe what claims
58
defendants were waiving. Opponents also protested that waiver “is
not a condition over which criminal defendants can bargain.”59 They
argued that to promote appeal waivers was to promote contracts of
adhesion. Third, critics pointed out that trial judges and attorneys
should not be encouraged to insulate from review their own past and
60
future misconduct through waiver of direct and collateral review.
Finally, waivers were assailed as bad policy because they undercut the
function of appellate courts in regulating the sentencing process.61
Even the Department of Justice warned, in its memo encouraging the
inclusion of appeal waivers, that the “disadvantage of the broad
sentencing appeal waiver is that it could result in guideline-free
sentencing of defendants in guilty plea cases, and it could encourage a
lawless district court to impose sentences in violation of the
guidelines.”62

58. See, e.g., Letter from Robert W. Ritchie, Chairman, Fed. Criminal Procedures Comm.,
Am. Coll. of Trial Lawyers, to Peter G. McCabe, Sec’y, Comm. on Rules of Practice and
Procedure, at 2 (Feb. 11, 1998) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (“At the time of a plea . . . a
defendant does not have the ability to see into the future to predict how a judge might
erroneously sentence him or her.”).
59. David E. Carney, Waiver of the Right to Appeal Sentencing in Plea Agreements with the
Federal Government, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1019, 1044 (1999); see United States v.
Melancon, 972 F.2d 566, 570–80 (5th Cir. 1992) (Parker, J., concurring specially) (emphasizing
that a waiver of “the right to appeal a sentence that has yet to be imposed . . . is inherently
uninformed and unintelligent”).
60. See Letter from the Nat’l Ass’n of Criminal Def. Lawyers, to Peter G. McCabe, Sec’y,
Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure, at 9 (Feb. 15, 1998) (on file with the Duke
Law Journal) (“We have no research on how appellate waivers would affect sentencing. It
would appear, however, that where both parties and the court know that nothing they do will be
subject to review, we are on the road to encouraging lawlessness.”).
61. See, e.g., id. at 10 (arguing that “[t]he wholesale use of appellate waivers will make it
impossible for the Commission to ‘review and revise’ sentences in a rational way,” and that
without a complete review of sentences, “it will be impossible to determine whether or when
unwarranted disparity of sentences exists”).
62. Keeney Memo, supra note 50, at 210; see, e.g., United States v. Raynor, 989 F. Supp. 43,
45 (D.D.C. 1997) (expressing concern over possible unchecked prosecutorial manipulation of
sentences after an appeal waiver); Melancon, 972 F.2d at 575 (Parker, J., concurring specially)
(arguing that enforcing appeal waivers insulates from review violations of departure rules,
erroneous applications of the Guidelines, and “factual inadequacies in the presentence reports
generated by nonjudicial probation officers”).
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63

The rule change moved ahead despite these objections, and
when the amendment went into effect in 1999, it was the green light
64
some prosecutors and judges had been waiting for. With the
exception of the D.C. Circuit, which has not yet squarely ruled on the
65
propriety of appeal waivers, each circuit has now endorsed their
validity while adopting its own exemptions for certain sorts of claims.
Common exemptions include claims that a sentence is based on race
discrimination,66 exceeds the statutory maximum authorized,67 or is
the product of ineffective assistance of counsel.68 In the wake of the
Court’s decision in Blakely in 2004, defense attorneys in districts
where appeal waivers were still uncommon found waivers proposed
as part of every plea agreement.69
Despite the near-uniform acceptance of appeal waivers by the
courts of appeals, their validity is as controversial as ever and has yet
to be addressed by the Supreme Court. With reformers poised to rely
on appellate review in the next wave of sentencing reform, it is time

63. The Advisory Committee on the Rules of Criminal Procedure believed “it was
appropriate to recognize what is apparently already taking place in a number of jurisdictions
and formally require trial judges in those jurisdictions to question the defendant about whether
his or her waiver was made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently.” H.R. DOC. NO. 106-55, at
13 (1999) (Conf. Rep.) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). A “disclaimer” was added to the
Committee Note, which reads “the Committee takes no position on the underlying validity of
such waivers.” Id. at 21–22.
64. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Defender #7 (“[E]very single plea agreement had
appeal waivers. . . . [starting] about the same time they were codified in Rule 11. Cases started
coming down saying that they are valid. As they became more and more prevalent, the practice
widened. When they put it in the rule it made it seem reasonable and expected.”).
65. In United States v. West, 392 F.3d 450 (D.C. Cir. 2004), the court enforced a waiver
clause in the defendant’s plea agreement, but only after noting that the defendant had failed to
provide a reason not to, id. at 452, and stating specifically that the court was not addressing the
question whether such waivers were valid as a general matter, id. at 460–61.
66. E.g., United States v. Baramdyka, 95 F.3d 840, 843 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v.
Jacobson, 15 F.3d 19, 22–23 (2d Cir. 1994).
67. E.g., United States v. Marin, 961 F.2d 493, 496 (4th Cir. 1992).
68. E.g., United States v. Attar, 38 F.3d 727, 732–33 (4th Cir. 1994). For a further
discussion of ineffective assistance claims, see infra notes 115–122 and accompanying text. Some
circuits have adopted a multifactor “miscarriage of justice” test. E.g., United States v. Khattak,
273 F.3d 557, 563 (3d Cir. 2001); United States v. Teeter, 257 F.3d 14, 24–25 (1st Cir. 2001).
69. In districts where appeal waivers had not been used before Blakely, prosecutors
suddenly announced waivers would be standard policy in every agreement. Memorandum
Regarding Departmental Legal Positions and Policies in Light of Blakely v. Washington from
James B. Comey, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to All Fed. Prosecutors 4 (July 2,
2004) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). Complained one defender interviewed shortly after
Blakely, “[T]his is hitting us all at once, in one fell swoop—Blakely, then waivers.” Telephone
Interview with Defender #5.
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to take a closer look at appeal waivers to see how they have affected
criminal practice.
III. ASSESSING APPEAL WAIVERS
Much of the debate about appeal waivers turns upon empirical
assertions, such as the claim by critics that defendants have no choice
but to sign waivers to secure plea agreements, or the claim by
supporters that ineffective assistance claims are usually exempted
from waivers. The interviews and data in this study provide a rich
source of new information about the nature, frequency, and effects
that appeal waivers have today. Before turning to the findings,
however, it is important to understand some of the limitations of the
statistical results reported here.
First, the data is based on a random sample from the group of FY
2003 cases that were coded by the Commission staff as including a
written plea agreement or other written agreement in the file. The
sample is quite large (971 cases), but it does not include the unknown
percentage of cases in which a plea agreement existed but was not
physically submitted to the Commission, nor does it include cases in
which a plea agreement was placed under seal (approximately 3
percent of all cases).70
Perhaps for these reasons, the mix of cases in our randomly
selected sample is somewhat different than the overall mix of cases
nationwide for FY 2003. For example, as shown in Figure 2, our
sample contains a slightly higher percentage of drug trafficking and
firearms cases, and a slightly lower percentage of fraud and
immigration cases. Our sample is also a bit heavy on Ninth Circuit
cases, and a bit light on Fifth Circuit cases, compared to the mix of
71
cases sentenced in FY 2003. Because downward departures are
much more common in drug trafficking cases than in any other type
of case (nearly 40 percent of trafficking cases in 2003 received a
downward departure), and more common in the Ninth Circuit than in
any other circuit (39 percent of all cases in 2003 from the Ninth
Circuit received a downward departure), it is also not surprising to
see in Figure 3 that in our sample there is also a larger proportion of
70. Of the approximately 70,000 cases sentenced in FY 2003, about 96 percent involved
conviction by guilty plea, and about 75 percent included some kind of written agreement. U.S.
SENTENCING COMM’N, 2003 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS 6 tbl.1A, 23
tbl.10 (2003).
71. See infra Figure 1.
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cases with downward departures than there is in all cases sentenced
72
under the Guidelines in 2003.
Figure 1. Case Distribution Among Circuits, Sample Compared to
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Figure 2. Case Distribution among Offense Type, Sample Compared
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72. Comparing the sample with 2003 data showed a nonrandom difference in the
distribution of cases among circuits and among the top four offense types, as well as a
nonrandom difference in the proportion of cases with substantial assistance or other downward
departures.
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We begin our examination of appeal waivers by considering
whether they have achieved the benefits that supporters hoped for.
We then turn to whether the costs of appeal waivers predicted by
opponents are reflected in our findings.
A. The Benefit of Waivers: Slowing the Rate of Appeals
Prosecutors and courts adopted appeal waivers primarily because
they hoped to reduce the number of sentencing appeals.73 A lower
appeal rate not only saves government resources, it also means more
74
finality—a particular concern for victims. Our evidence suggests that
appeal waivers have probably had these intended effects.
Throughout the 1990s, the number of convictions grew faster
75
than the number of appeals. Specifically, as Figure 4 illustrates, the
rate of appeals per conviction peaked in 1994 at about double the rate
prior to 1987 (when the Sentencing Reform Act became effective)
and has consistently declined since then. Importantly, the appeal rate
declined even when considering only cases sentenced after a guilty
76
plea, which are less likely to generate appeals than tried cases. This

73. See supra notes 46–52 and accompanying text.
74. Carney, supra note 59, at 1037–38.
75. JOHN SCALIA, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FEDERAL CRIMINAL APPEALS, 1999,
WITH TRENDS 1985–99 (2001), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/fca99.pdf.
76. See infra Figure 6. The government’s more frequent insistence on appeal waivers may
cause some defendants to forego written agreements altogether, instead pleading guilty
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suggests that the drop in the overall appeal rate cannot be attributed
solely to the decline during the same period in the number of cases
77
that went to trial. It is possible that the shrinking appeal rate was
caused by other factors, but the general timing of the decline
coincides with the increased enforcement of waivers by the courts of
appeals.78
Figure 4. Appeal Rate 1998–2004—All Offenses
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Note: Rate is the total number of criminal appeals for the year divided by the
total number of defendants convicted in district court for the same year.

“straight up” to the indictment, sometimes known as “open” or “blind” pleas. An effort to
determine whether the proportion of “open” or “blind” pleas had increased compared to the
proportion of guilty pleas with agreement using the Commission’s data was inconclusive. The
coding of variables that could help identify the presence or absence of a plea agreement rather
than an open plea was entirely revised in 1997 and 1998. Even after 1998, the variable
(DSPLEA) is an unreliable measure of open versus negotiated pleas over time, due to missing
cases and the ambiguous meaning of some values.
77. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASE PROCESSING, 2001, WITH
TRENDS 1982–2001 (2003), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/fccp01.pdf.
78. Among alternative explanations for a decline in the frequency of appeals during this
period are the 1999 amendment to Rule 11 allowing stipulations to Guidelines ranges and
factors, see supra notes 24–26 and accompanying text, and the gradual resolution of initially
controversial sentencing issues by the courts of appeals.
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Figure 5. Appeal Rate 1994–2004—All, Drug, and Immigration
Offenses Compared
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Note: Appeal rates are derived by dividing the number of appeals filed in cases of the
specified type by the number of defendants convicted that year of that offense type.
Sources: Federal Criminal Case Processing, 1982–1993; Federal Criminal Case
Processing 1982–2002; Statistical Tables for December 2003 and 2004, Tables B7 and
D4, from the website for the Administrative Office of the United States Courts
(values for 2003 and 2004).

Figure 6. Appeal Rate Comparing Total Appeals to Guilty Plea
Convictions
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Note: Rate is the total number of criminal appeals for the year divided by the number
of defendants convicted by guilty plea for the same year.
Source: Commission Annual Statistical Reports.
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Prosecutors interviewed for our study also reported that they
believed waivers had reduced their appellate burden. One prosecutor
commented that the adoption of appeal waivers “has been wildly
successful. Looking at the stats, we are writing far fewer briefs. . . . I
79
would say it [has] led to a 25% drop.” Another prosecutor
volunteered that waivers save “significant resources. . . . From a
prosecutor’s perspective with limited resources, the broader we can
make these waivers the better. If [defendants] give up the right to jury
trial, they should give up the rest as well.”80 Reported another,
“Seems to me that it has narrowed the issues on appeal[;] even if
there is no proof that the number of appeals went down, appeals are
now easier to respond to.”81
B. The Costs of Appeal Waivers
As for the anticipated costs of appeal waivers, our findings do
not present a simple story. We review below the information that the
interviews and data have provided relating to six criticisms of appeal
waivers.
1. Are They Adhesion Contracts? Based on our interviews and
waiver sample, we must answer this question, “No.” The prediction
that defendants have neither power to avoid signing agreements with
unlimited waivers, nor leverage to negotiate benefits in return for
signing them, has proved demonstrably untrue, at least in some
districts. Defense attorneys in some districts report that they have had
the ability, particularly when supported by the trial bench,82 to avoid
79. Telephone Interview with Prosecutor #1.
80. Telephone Interview with Prosecutor #2.
81. Telephone Interview with Prosecutor #6.
82. Some trial judges initially balked at endorsing appeal waivers and would reject
agreements with waivers in them. Consider the comments of Defender #9:
I used to say at the plea that these things were illegal because you can’t waive your
right to appeal voluntariness and knowing understanding of the waiver itself. If I held
a gun to my client’s head and say “Sign this,” he’s gotta be able to appeal on that
basis. That’s what I’d say to the judge. For a while they took it out. But I gave up.
They put it all back in.
See also Telephone Interview with Defender #7 (“Some [trial judges] will still resist accepting
them if there is a real dispute, but this is borderline participation in the negotiations in my view.
One judge was against these, and the government was going to go after him with a writ of
mandamus, because he wasn’t accepting them.”); Telephone Interview with Defender #20
(“[J]udges didn’t like it. . . . [They b]elieved it would insulate them from being reviewed.
Thought it was wrong. They harassed the government about it—why did they really need them?
[The] [g]overnment eventually gave up.”).
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these waivers, to limit them, or, alternatively, to obtain significant
concessions in return for signing them.
a. Evidence That Defendants Are Avoiding Appeal Waivers.
Several interviewees reported negotiating agreements without appeal
waivers, sometimes as a result of a threat to plead guilty without an
agreement (known as pleading “open” or “blind”) or to go to trial if
the waiver was not removed.83 Over one-third (323, or 34.8 percent) of
the agreements in our random sample contained no clause waiving
review, while 619 (65.2 percent) included some waiver clause. As
illustrated in Figure 7, the proportion of agreements with waiver
clauses varied widely among the circuits. It was a rare plea agreement
in the Ninth Circuit that lacked a waiver clause, whereas in the D.C.,
First, and Third Circuits, waivers were the exception, not the rule. If
the cases from the Ninth Circuit are excluded, only 52 percent of the
agreements in the sample contained any sort of waiver.

Additionally, Prosecutor #2 said:
Some judges were opposed to any language. They refused to take a plea. If we felt
that the government was conceding something or giving something up, they were
waiving this knowingly and with advice of counsel we would stick to it. The judges
would understand. Not sure if we ended up with [a] complete standoff. There were
two judges who didn’t like them, questioned whether they constitutionally should be
allowed. Others look at them on a case-by-case basis.
Similarly, Prosecutor #1 indicated:
Initially, there were judges who said this is not right. One or two who made
statements later [at the plea hearing or at sentencing] that undercut the appeal
waiver. We always include in an advice of rights we prepare as a back up on the
judge’s colloquy, asking what he is waiving in [the] plea agreement. Some judges are
resistant, but our court of appeals has educated them.
83. For example, one defense attorney reported,
Only a very small percentage of agreements will include waivers, and then only if
[they] receive approval . . . . We have a very aggressive United States Attorney’s
office and they will seek them in every case, but we refuse them, in all but the most
compelling circumstances. . . . Only if there is a significant advantage that could be
achieved by entering into it, an advantage that we couldn’t obtain otherwise, by trial
or negotiation [do we agree to waivers]. Usually the prosecutor would have to agree
not to file an 851 [a charge that increases the minimum sentence] or drop a charge or
not bring a charge. Not very common.
Telephone Interview with Defender #19. Similarly, Defender #21 reported,
[Signing an appeal waiver meant y]ou get the third point [off for acceptance of
responsibility under 3E1.1]. Can’t get it here if you plead open. . . . Second, we can
still bargain counts in this district. May have a 924(c) [firearm charge carrying a
mandatory minimum consecutive sentence] dismissed, and take the two-point
enhancement for gun. Third, they might limit drug quantity. Particularly if there are
several transactions separated by time [the parties will agree not to count some]. . . .
[I]t is the regular practice that if you can’t come to an agreement, and the defense
attorney says I’m going to plead open . . . then the United States Attorney would
agree to take out the appeal waiver.
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Figure 7. Percentage of Plea Agreements with Waivers, by Circuit
D.C.
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b. Obtaining Concessions in Exchange. Waiver supporters also
argue that defendants who sign waivers are getting something in
return as part of the bargain. One defender’s comments are telling:
Two of our judges said they will not accept an agreement with a
waiver. . . . The defendant complained. The defendant would say, “I
want this because I want the 5K1 [downward departure for
substantial assistance]. I want my 5K1!” The judges realized there
was a problem, that they were hurting some defendants by refusing
84
these [waivers].

Appellate courts, too, often point out that they must uphold waivers
85
to preserve their value for defendants. Judge Posner, for example,
recently described why a waiver should be enforced:
The government didn’t want [the defendant] to appeal and was
willing to offer concessions that he and his lawyer considered
adequate to induce him to forego his right to appeal. Had [the

84. Telephone Interview with Defender #7.
85. See, e.g., United States v. Granik, 386 F.3d 404, 412 (2d Cir. 2004) (“Knowing and
voluntary appellate waivers included in plea agreements must be enforced because, if they are
not, ‘the covenant not to appeal becomes meaningless and would cease to have value as a
bargaining chip in the hands of defendants.’” (citations omitted)).
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defendant] insisted on an escape hatch that would have enabled him
to appeal if the law changed in his favor after he was sentenced, the
86
government would have been charier in its concessions.

Many practitioners confirmed that when waivers are included as
part of a plea agreement, those waivers are often exchanged for
concessions of one sort or another from the prosecutor. One
defender’s explanation was typical of many of those interviewed:
“Our position is we’re only going to sign one if we get a significant
concession. . . . If not, we plead open, [because there’s] not much
advantage to entering into an agreement.”87 Another explained,
When the prosecutor insisted on these, in one or two cases, we
would withdraw, saying it was a conflict of interest. Then the court
and the government were put in the position of spending a lot more
money, [and] the government backed down in a hurry. Eventually
we came to this agreement: [n]o appeal waivers without a significant
chit in return. In my office any appeal waiver has to be approved by
me. So they don’t bother to ask unless they can come up with
88
something in hand.

Another defender listed the usual price for agreeing to an appeal
waiver in his district:
An agreement that an enhancement [under the Guidelines] doesn’t
apply; that they will not oppose the minimum sentence in the
Guidelines range; that they will not bring an additional charge

86. United States v. Bownes, 405 F.3d 634, 636 (7th Cir. 2005).
87. Telephone Interview with Defender #14. Pleading open was a common response to
appeal waivers. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Defender #1 (“Most cases plead open, but
enter into agreement when consequences of not agreeing are so bad, they’ll drop a charge or
some relevant conduct.”); Telephone Interview with Defender #4 (“[M]y response is to plead
guilty without a plea agreement [in about 50 to 75 percent of cases]. They are throwing so much
crap in the plea agreements these days.”); Telephone Interview with Defender #5 (“Originally,
when this first happened, we reacted by entering open pleas and abandoning agreements. . . .
My fear is that if we refuse to sign and do an open plea, then they will overcharge to preclude
open pleas.”); Telephone Interview with Defender #9 (“The default position was plead open, so
unless you were afraid of upward departure or you want the Guidelines calculations in front of
probation [i.e., prior to the preparation of the presentence report], you don’t sign it. This was
allegedly the office position.”); Telephone Interview with Defender #19 (“We reject them.
Mostly open pleas, but we also reject them from plea agreements as well. . . . Now it may be
different in districts where you can get substantial advantages from waivers, under fast-track or
negotiation, I understand waivers might be more attractive.”); Telephone Interview with
Defender #21 (“[A]bout 25–30% of the open pleas are in meth cases. The penalties are so
outrageous, and they have a hard time proving quantity. And even with acceptance they don’t
give you much.”).
88. Telephone Interview with Defender #8.
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carrying a consecutive sentence . . . ; that they won’t enhance with a
prior [conviction] that would up the mandatory minimum . . . ; or a
stipulation that there is no other relevant conduct, or [otherwise
89
limiting an] enhancement under Chapter 3.

Explained another,
[I]f the government was dropping . . . a mandatory minimum, they
can stick whatever they want into it. There has to be a significant
benefit to the client. . . . Say a safety-valve stipulation or in some
cases a stipulation to a mitigating role. Anything really significant
like that. . . . We say we don’t like them but when you tell the client
90
this will save you two years, they’ll say, “I’ll sign.”

89. Telephone Interview with Defender #3. “Relevant conduct” is defined in U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.3 (2004) (providing that a sentence should take into
account “all acts and omissions committed, aided, . . . or willfully caused by the defendant;
and . . . all reasonably foreseeable acts and omissions of others in furtherance of the jointly
undertaken criminal activity” that occurred during the preparation or commission of the offense
of conviction, or during attempt to avoid detection and responsibility for that offense). Chapter
3 of the Guidelines includes provisions specifying certain increases in the defendant’s offense
level, which is used to determine the sentence, depending upon whether or not certain facts are
present. Id. §§ 3A1.1–C1.2.
90. Telephone Interview with Defender #15. This attorney also reported, “This is a district
that will do charge bargains as part of a deal.” Id. For additional comments on the same topic,
see Telephone Interview with Defender #3 (“[I]n a drug case, the government would threaten to
give nothing on priors, say he’s got to waive his appeal or we’re going to enhance him.”);
Telephone Interview with Defender #8 (“We would require either a departure or a
misdemeanor or something similar.”); Telephone Interview with Defender #14 (“[W]e’re only
going to sign one if we get a significant concession. Generally we get a downward departure for
cooperation. If not, we plead open, not much advantage to entering into an agreement.”).
Similarly, Defender #7 reported,
Our policy was not to agree unless we would actually get something of substance in
return, more than the bottom of the Guidelines range and acceptance points. These
would be worthless because the judge would give them anyway in a blind plea. So it
would boil down to a 5K departure or, if there was a closely contested Guidelines
issue, then the government would have to agree that the enhancement would not
apply. . . . They’ll agree to dismiss a bunch of counts, but it doesn’t matter because of
the Guidelines. If they agree to dismiss a count that carries a consecutive sentence
that would be [enough to sign a waiver].
Defender #17 also reported,
[We] won’t enter one unless there is a major concession [such as a] declination to
charge a readily provable offense, limitation of relevant conduct, sometimes an
agreement to a minor role, 5K cooperation. . . . Our leverage is that we’ll just go to
trial. Then you have to be sure to . . . explain [to the judge] that you were ready to
plead open to X felony, but the government decided to pile this on unless you signed
the appeal waiver. Judges wouldn’t like that. . . . [I]n our office, you have to go
through a supervisor to do a plea agreement with an appeal waiver. The policy here is
we won’t sign unless we get something for it.
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Admittedly, the claims of defenders that they are negotiating
good deals for waivers are self-serving. Several prosecutors, however,
confirmed that they paid a price for the appeal waivers: “Often we
give up cooperation [5K departure]. . . . There are individual
defenders who will not enter into agreements with waivers, but will
plead open . . . . So they can pressure [us] to give something else up in
91
return for the waiver.”
To examine whether these reports were reflected in the data, we
compared the frequency of the same sentencing concessions in cases
with and without waivers. Some government concessions appeared
more frequently in agreements with waivers than in agreements
without. Specifically, as shown in Tables 1 and 2, those who waived
appeal were more likely than nonwaiving defendants to receive a
promise by the government to seek a safety-valve reduction
(applicable in drug cases only), as well as to actually receive
92
downward departures.
Several cases in our sample had text explanations for departures.
93
Looking specifically at these cases, judges were more likely to list
“pursuant to plea agreement” as a reason for departure if there was a
waiver present. The judge in one waiver case expressly credited the
waiver as the reason for the downward departure.94

91. Telephone Interview with Prosecutor #1. Said another, “The only way to free fall from
the man[datory] min[imum] is the safety valve; that will mean we can get a broader appeal
waiver.” Telephone Interview with Prosecutor #4.
92. It is important not to overstate the direction or degree of any relationship between the
presence of waiver clauses and the use of downward departures. Mapping the rate of
substantial-assistance departures and the rate of other departures for FY 2003 by circuit, the
patterns look nothing like the pattern of waiver usage among circuits. This suggests that
although the presence of a waiver has some influence on the likelihood of a downward
departure, factors other than waivers have a much stronger influence.
93. See infra Table 3.
94. The explanation given was “waiver of rights” (the case was from the Southern District
of California). Another case credited “savings to government” as the reason for downward
departure.
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Table 1. Substantial Assistance & Safety Valve, by Presence of Waiver
Type of Departure
Substantial Assistance Departure Part of
Agreement

% Cases with % Cases without
Waiver (n=619) Waiver (n=323)
15.5% (96)

13.9% (45)

Safety Valve Part of Agreement

7.1% (44)

6.2% (20)

Substantial Assistance Departure Received

14.4% (89)

13.6% (44)

Safety Valve Received*

19.7% (122)

14.6% (47)

*p < 0.05.
Note: The first two measures were coded from the agreements in each of the sample
cases; the last two are from Commission FY 2003 data for each case.

Table 2. Other Departures, by Presence of Waiver
% Cases with % Cases without
Waiver (n=619) Waiver (n=323)
Other Downward Departure Part of Agreement
Other Downward Departure Received*

3.1% (19)

2.8% (9)

22.0% (136)

9.6% (31)

*p < 0.05.
Note: The first measure was coded from the agreements in sample cases; the second
is from Commission FY 2003 data for each case. Ninety-three cases (68 percent)
receiving departures other than for substantial assistance were in two districts—
Arizona and Southern District of California.

Table 3. Cases with Specified Reason for Departure, by
Presence of Waiver
Reason Specified for Downward Departure

% Cases with % Cases without
Waiver (n=619) Waiver (n=323)

Substantial Assistance Motion*

39.3% (90)

57.1% (44)

Pursuant to a Plea Agreement*

22.7% (52)

10.4% (8)

*p < 0.05.
Note: Source is Commission FY 2003 data, for sample cases.

A number of concessions were no more likely to appear in cases
with waivers than in cases without them. Defendants who waived
review were no more likely than defendants who entered into plea
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agreements without waivers to receive two or three credits for
95
accepting responsibility. And defendants who waived review were
actually less likely to be sentenced at the bottom of the range or to
96
receive charge concessions.
Table 4. Where in Range Sentenced, by Presence of Waiver
% Cases with % Cases without
Waiver (n=619) Waiver (n=323)
Guideline Range Minimum Sentence Imposed*

35.4% (219)

46.4% (150)

Guideline Range Maximum Sentence Imposed*

4.4% (27)

6.5% (21)

*p < 0.05.
Note: Source is Commission FY 2003 data, for sample cases.

Table 5. Charge Agreements, by Presence of Waiver
Type of Agreement

% Cases with % Cases without
Waiver (n=619) Waiver (n=323)

Government Agrees Not to Add, or to Drop
Charges*

50.4% (311)

57.9% (187)

Government Agrees to Drop Charges*

42.3% (262)

49.5% (160)

*p < 0.05.
Note: Charge bargaining was measured in two ways. The first measure
(PLEATYPE) was coded based on the specific subsection of Rule 11 that the
parties noted in the agreement as well as the actual promises made. The second
measure looked solely at whether the government expressly agreed to drop a
charge.

95. See infra Table 6.
96. See infra Tables 4 & 5. A large percentage of all agreements included promises not to
add charges or promises to drop charges, despite the tough stand against charge bargains by
official Department of Justice policy. See Ashcroft Memo, supra note 30 (“[C]harges should not
be filed simply to exert leverage to induce a plea.”); see also Amie N. Ely, Note, Prosecutorial
Discretion as an Ethical Necessity: The Ashcroft Memorandum’s Curtailment of the Prosecutor’s
Duty to “Seek Justice,” 90 CORNELL L. REV. 237, 239 (2004) (examining the effect of the
Ashcroft Memo requiring federal prosecutors to “charge and pursue the most serious, readily
provable offense or offenses that are supported by the facts of the case” unless the case meets
one of the enumerated exceptions and authorization is obtained from a designated supervisor
(quoting Ashcroft Memo, supra note 30)); cf. United States v. Morgan, 406 F.3d 135, 137 (2d
Cir. 2005) (barring a Booker claim because of the presence of an appeal waiver and reasoning
that because the defendant “learned the sentencing range sought by the government and
avoided exposure to additional drug counts, . . . . [l]imiting his criminal exposure in this way
presumably was of considerable value to him”).
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Table 6. Acceptance of Responsibility Credits, by Presence of Waiver
% Cases with % Cases without
Waiver (n=619) Waiver (n=323)
Agreed to Three Points for Acceptance
of Responsibility

40.2% (249)

41.8% (135)

Agreed to Two Points

15.8% (98)

13.3% (43)

Agreed to Unspecified Adjustment*

12.6% (78)

23.8% (77)

Three Points Received

70.3% (435)

72.1% (233)

Two Points Received

25.5% (158)

24.8% (80)

*p < 0.05.
Note: The first three values were coded from the agreements in the sample cases. The
last two were from Commission FY 2003 data for those cases. In FY 2003, 63.2
percent of all defendants convicted by trial or guilty plea received 3 points for
acceptance of responsibility; 29.4 percent received 2 points.

These findings tend to confirm most defenders’ reports that they
consider it a bad deal to trade an appeal waiver for acceptance points,
a sentence at the bottom of the range, or a bargained charge without
a meaningful cap on relevant conduct. Defenders reported that these
promises offer few advantages over the sentence a defendant would
receive by pleading guilty to the indictment without waiving review.
The sentencing concessions related to the presence of a waiver are
much more substantial. More than one of every five waiver cases
received a downward departure other than substantial assistance,
compared to one of every ten nonwaiver cases in our sample. And
nearly one in five waiver cases received a safety valve adjustment,
compared to less than one in eight nonwaiver cases.
2. Unknowing Waivers. Perhaps the most common objection to
appeal waivers is that defendants are waiving the possibility of
challenging future error, error which is unknowable at the time the
waiver is signed.97 Some comments by defenders echoed this concern.
“What I don’t like about them is you are waiving something you don’t
know. You cannot know whether you are going to make a mistake, a
number of things can happen. It is a dangerous thing to do. . . . Your
98
client may suffer for it.”

97.
98.

See supra note 58.
Telephone Interview with Defender #7. As Defender #5 said:
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Both the interviews and the data from the agreements in the
sample suggested that this objection overstates the uncertainty that
many defendants face when signing waivers. As waiver critics fear,
some defendants are heading blindly into sentencing having waived
whatever error may come their way. Other defendants, however, are
able to minimize the risk of waiving review by tying down much of
what goes into the sentencing calculation with stipulations about
sentencing facts, by agreeing upon a sentence or a sentence cap, or by
reserving certain claims for appeal.
a. Stipulations. Defenders and prosecutors both reported that
once appeal waivers appeared, stipulations to specific sentences,
sentence ranges, or sentencing factors became more common in plea
agreements. Defenders insisted upon stipulations to reduce the risk of
a later surprise at sentencing that could not be reviewed because of
the waiver.99 Explained one defender,

[Waivers] are unconscionable. Nobody’s perfect. Lawyers aren’t perfect, judges aren’t
perfect. Defendants should have the right to challenge their sentencing if we get it
wrong. I don’t see what interest the government has in cutting off the right to
review—what interest would they have in an unconstitutionally excessive or
erroneous sentence? . . . The uncertainty because of what judges will do with
sentence, that makes it unfair.
Similarly, Defender #6 said:
I’m worried about when Probation comes in and contradicts the stipulation. I always
had to worry about whether Probation is going to do what we expect. . . . Appeal
waivers risk agreeing to something you didn’t anticipate.
Additionally, Defender #3 commented:
[Because of all of the legal uncertainty about sentencing,] I’m very uncomfortable
with them . . . . I have a case on appeal where the defendant has a prior conviction,
but [it] may not be a ‘crime of violence’ . . . [and] the question is whether that
qualifies for four point adjustment. . . . So [you] really don’t know what you are
waiving. . . . But the government holds all the cards, and you don’t want to screw your
client because you’re trying to look smart.
99. See Telephone Interview with Defender #7 (“[I]f there was a closely contested
Guidelines issue, then the government would have to agree that the enhancement would not
apply.”). As Defender #8 indicated:
In this district, . . . we’ll sit down and negotiate, say “We’ll eat this enhancement, but
you have to drop the others.” We’ll agree that—using 11(c)(1)(C)—this is the
appropriate range, or agree that this is not going to apply, that it will go away. Then
the case is appeal proof for everybody. We’d probably agree to waive appeal from
Blakely if we’ve agreed like this.
Defender #12 concurred:
[I rejected the agreement in one case] but it sort of backfired. At the sentencing
hearing, the government brought in a guy to testify about how he had [x] kilos of
cocaine and that judge found for the government. Lost everything I tried to gain,
trying to save my client’s right to appeal. So the risk is that at sentencing, where the
probation office, government witnesses come in that can raise the sentence above
what you were expecting.
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We have some aggressive probation officers that would stick in all
sorts of adjustments, or criminal history would come back messed
up. Our concern is if the court makes an error, we wouldn’t be able
to fix it. [So w]e’d negotiate it. . . . Most of the time the judges go
along with the stipulation. . . . If you stipulate that night is day,
you’re going to have a problem. But if it isn’t obviously false, they
will go along . . . . The agreements are more detailed. It is getting to
100
the point where we agree on almost everything.

Reported another defender,
About the same time appeal waivers came in, that’s when probation
said, “We’re accepting the stipulations.” Except really obvious stuff,
like if my guy shot somebody, he can’t claim he didn’t have a gun. So
this is important in considering appeal waivers, because we’re going
into it knowing that the [p]robation [o]fficer will not upset
101
stipulations.

100. Telephone Interview with Defender #15. Additionally, consider the comments of
Defender #21:
The Probation Office will follow the plea agreement. It’s the practice in [names
location], but in [different location], they do not. They routinely report on everything.
Some judges will go along with it, some will not. For over fifteen or sixteen years, the
judges have decided that if the prosecutor makes the recommendation and the client
looks at it and says, “[T]his is what I’m facing if I sign this agreement,” then they
shouldn’t change it, because the defendant is expecting it as part of the deal. Now in
[the other district, in the other circuit], it has never been like that. You could plead to
five grams and find out at sentencing it was 300.
Defender #16 noted:
[It d]epends on the judge, whether you want an open plea. . . . If I went in with an
open plea and the government is going to present all of this relevant conduct[, see
infra note 89,] and the court might be receptive to finding by a preponderance that
the relevant conduct occurred, it’s a risk. [It is d]ifferent if there is no relevant
conduct. If there is, you’d want to stipulate.
As Defender #12 indicated, “[W]hat is the advantage of signing that agreement? The advantage
is you know what you get. Without it, it is possible you wouldn’t get what you are expecting, you
never know what is lurking for you at sentencing.” Finally, Defender #11 reported that
[in return for an appeal waiver] they may not put in the drug amounts that trigger the
man[datory] min[imum], [they] might stipulate to an amount for the Guideline[s]
range rather than man min, or in a fraud case where the investigators have so far
turned up a small loss amount, they will agree not to look for more frauds, agree on
that loss amount. Now the [p]robation [o]fficer could come up with more at
sentencing, but if the government hasn’t already looked in that next box to find it, the
[p]robation [o]fficer won’t either. . . . In most cases where there is an appeal waiver,
there are no issues. The prosecutor generally agrees on all the Guidelines factors; if
not in agreement, have a hearing rather than an agreement. Usually [you are] not
losing anything by waiver. But if you are losing, [you] shouldn’t have to go without
appeal, [and] the case law here allows most to get heard. I’m sure we’ve had some
good issues that have been waived, I don’t see many.
101. Telephone Interview with Defender #2; see also Telephone Interview with Defender
#10 (“[They t]ried appeal waivers a couple of times early on, we resisted, judges resisted, they
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Prosecutors agreed that in return for appeal waivers defendants
are looking for stipulations to sentencing factors. . . . In money cases,
they are looking for stipulations on loss amounts. . . . If I agree to
come down from the provable loss, I’ll insist that you have to agree
to a much broader appeal waiver. They are looking for role
reductions. The loss amount is one they can argue over and
negotiate. The role is harder. I can’t always look the other way on
102
that.

Table 7. Sentence-Related Stipulations, by Presence of Waiver
Parties Agreed to . . .
Sentence Range*

% Cases with % Cases without
Waiver (n=619) Waiver (n=323)
32.2% (200)

20.4% (66)

Sentence Length

5.2% (32)

4.0% (13)

Sentence Cap*

6.0% (37)

.6% (2)

Sentence Type

1.1% (7)

.9% (3)

Base-Offense Level

33.9% (210)

33.4% (108)

Specific-Offense Characteristics

11.1% (69)

8.7% (28)

Final-Offense Level

6.8% (42)

8.4% (27)

Chapter 3 Adjustment other than 3E1.1
(Role, etc.)

12.3% (76)

8.4% (27)

Criminal History Category*

8.9% (55)

5.3% (17)

Drug Amount

11.0% (68)

11.1% (36)

Loss Amount

5.3% (33)

3.7% (12)

Government Will Not Seek Upward
Departure

6.5% (40)

5.9% (19)

*p < 0.05.

Table 7 shows that stipulations as to sentence ranges, caps, or
criminal history category are more common in waiver cases than in
nonwaiver cases. Not only do these stipulations appear to occur more
often in waiver cases, but the data suggests that another feature

didn’t take. Recently they are trying again, we resist. The only time we will allow them is with
a[Rule 11](c)(1)(C) plea. The [assistant U.S. attorneys] started to get more strident for a while,
but they backed off.”).
102. Telephone Interview with Prosecutor #4. A defendant’s “role” in the offense may
influence the sentence: a leader faces a more severe sentence than a defendant who played only
an insignificant part in the crime. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 3B1.1–2 (2004).
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associated with more predictable sentencing is more prevalent in
waiver cases: parties are much more likely to have entered into some
sort of binding sentence agreement, sometimes known as a C plea,
when a waiver is present. A C plea is a guilty plea under subsection
(C) of Rule 11(c)(1). Unlike a guilty plea entered under subsection
(A) or (B) of Rule 11(c)(1), which may include a sentence
recommendation that the judge can accept or reject, a C plea includes
sentencing stipulations that the judge may not later reject once the
plea agreement is accepted.103
Table 8. C Pleas, by Presence of Waiver
% Cases with % Cases without
Waiver (n=619) Waiver (n=323)
Plea Conditioned upon Judge’s Acceptance of
Stipulations*

21.5% (133)

3.7% (12)

Judge Rejects Stipulations

14.9% (92)

18.9% (61)

*p < 0.05.
Note: The first value was coded from the agreements in the sample cases. There is
considerable variation between districts in the use of C pleas. In the Western District
of Texas, of 60 cases, 52 had waivers but none were C pleas; in the District of Arizona
of 128 cases, 120 had waivers, and 111 were C pleas; in the Southern District of
California, of 37 cases all had waivers but none were C pleas. Source for judge
rejections is Commission FY 2003 data (ACCGDLN=0) for sample cases.

b. Limiting Scope of Waiver. Another way defendants can
reduce the risk posed by an appeal waiver is to limit the scope of the
waiver itself, so that appeal remains available under certain
circumstances. Some very broad, blanket waivers discard the right to
challenge the sentence or the conviction on any ground whatsoever,
104
on appeal or collateral attack. Of the waivers in our sample, nearly

103. See infra Table 8.
104. See, e.g., Goodwin, supra note 45, at 213 (quoting from a broad appeal waiver in which
the defendant waived the right to appeal or collateral attack on any ground). See also United
States v. Raynor:
[Y]our client voluntarily and knowingly waives the right to appeal any sentence
within the maximum provided in the statute(s) of conviction, or the manner in which
that sentence was determined . . . on any ground whatever. Your client also
voluntarily and knowingly waives your client’s right to challenge the sentence or the
manner in which it was determined in any collateral attack, included but not limited
to a motion under [§ 2255].
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105
80 percent barred both direct and collateral challenges. About onethird (35 percent) barred review of sentence only, whereas 63 percent
barred review of both sentence and conviction.
Narrower waivers bar enforcement of the waiver under certain
situations or allow appeal of certain claims. Both our interviews and
the cases suggest that most waiver clauses have been narrowed in
some respect. For example, one waiver provides: “Defendant waives
all rights on direct appeal except for up or down departure, and
waives all habeas rights except ineffective assistance and
prosecutorial misconduct.”106 Under another, the defendant “waive[s]
any right to appeal all . . . issues with the exception of an illegal
107
sentence, or a sentence over the statutory max[imum].”
Interviewees reported that many waivers expressly allow appeals
should the sentence exceed the specified sentencing range or number
108
of months or should the defendant raise specific issues—presumably
those sentencing issues that worry the defendant most. For example,
one defender reported,

If you have a clearly arguable Guidelines difference, when you could
go either way, 50% of the time I can get that guideline excluded
from the appeal waiver. . . . [I]n the alternative, we just agree to a
lower number, lower the cap below which you can’t appeal. See[,] as
a result of [our circuit’s case law], the agreements specify that you
waive your right to appeal unless the sentence is above [X], a

989 F. Supp. 43, 43 (D.D.C. 1997) (quoting from the plea agreement). Defender #4 reported that
under the standard clause in his district, “[T]he defendant waives direct appeal, 2255 and
habeas, [including] ineffective assistance.”
105. Of the sample, 113 barred appeal only (18.3 percent of 619 waivers), and 494 barred
appeal and collateral review (79.8 percent of all 619 waivers). Cf. Defender #17 (“I don’t know
why the government has not included 2255 [waivers] in the agreements here. Part of it might be
the AEDPA [Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996] doesn’t leave much, so
they don’t view it as so essential. They almost encourage that first petition now.”).
106. Telephone Interview with Defender #3. Others reported similar standard waiver
language. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Defender #13 (“We waiv[e] any attack on [the]
sentence other than ineffective assistance [or] prosecutorial misconduct, and [retain the right to]
appeal [an] upward departure.”).
107. Telephone Interview with Defender #17; see also United States v. Gibson, 356 F.3d 761,
765, 767 (7th Cir. 2004) (vacating a conviction and sentence due to sentencing over the statutory
maximum when an appeal waiver reserved this sort of claim).
108. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Defender #9 (“Defendant will not file an appeal or
otherwise challenge the conviction or sentence in the event of an imposed sentence of [X]
months or less.”). For an argument that all waivers should be contingent upon sentencing within
a specified range or up to a specified maximum, see Recent Case, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1116, 1121
(1998).

032006 01_KING AND ONEILL.DOC

4/24/2006 12:26 PM

244

[Vol. 55:209

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

specified sentence. The government thinks they have to read this
way to comply with the case law. So if you have a dispute about
some Guidelines calculation, you just lower the number in the
109
waiver.

Findings from our sample indicated that a significant proportion of
110
waivers were limited in these ways.
Table 9. Agreements with Exemptions from Waiver That
Limit Exposure
Appeal Allowed If . . .

% Cases with Waiver (n=619)

Judge Departs Upward from Guidelines Range

36.5% (226)

Sentence Exceeds Statutory Maximum

28.9% (179)

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

28.6% (177)

Sentence Exceeds Specified Range

22.8% (141)

Prosecutorial Misconduct/Brady Violation

18.1% (112)

Government Appeals

13.2% (82)

Sentence is “Illegal”

7.4% (46)

Sentence Exceeds Specified Sentence

4.8% (30)

Retroactive Application of Law

4.5% (28)

Unconstitutional Statute

1.6% (10)

No Limitations on Waiver

21.0% (130)

c. Uncertainty and No Concessions for Some. Despite the
variety of concessions and terms tying down potential sentencing
factors in many of these agreements, the interviews suggested that in
some districts the concessions given in exchange for a defendant’s
waiver were negligible, and the waivers were sweeping. Some
defenders reported getting no stipulations, exemptions for certain

109. Telephone Interview with Defender #9; see also Telephone Interview with Defender #1
(“[We a]lso have been successful in getting in exceptions for upward departures.”); Telephone
Interview with Defender #2 (“When we pushed ‘em we could get the appeal waiver taken out,
or we’d modify it. For example, we’d agree to everything except one issue, and exempt that one
from the waiver. So we’d stip[ulate] to everything and agree to the waiver, but would be able to
dispute that one issue, gave us some latitude.”).
110. See infra Table 9. Case law confirms that defendants who reserve issues for appeal in
their appeal waivers sometimes benefit from doing so. See, e.g., United States v. Apodaca, 127
F. App’x 726, 727 (5th Cir. 2005) (vacating a sentence because of trial judge error in departing
upward, when upward departure was the only claim excepted from appeal waiver in plea
agreement).
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claims, sentencing discounts, or charging breaks in return for signing
waivers. Reported one defender: “The offers they make[,] they don’t
negotiate. The United States Attorney doesn’t see this as deserving
extra consideration. Nothing additional is given. . . . ‘It’s our way or
111
the highway.’” Some prosecutors reported giving no additional
concessions, “If they don’t like the deal, they can plead open.”112
Reported another,
I’ve rarely seen a defense attorney bargain a waiver out of the
agreement. Have I seen more stipulations as a result of the
agreements? No, not really. There are big differences in the use of
stipulations, but these are much more a function of the historical
practice in a given district than whether or not there is a waiver in
113
the agreement.

3. Licensing Misconduct or Lack of Care. Several interviewees
echoed the concern of critics that waivers, particularly those that
forfeit collateral review, allow attorneys to insulate themselves from
potential claims for misconduct related to the defendant’s case. This
sort of agreement poses an obvious conflict of interest because
barring the defendant from raising allegations of improper conduct is
in the attorney’s self-interest. Consider this candid comment by one
defender: “[F]rom the attorney’s standpoint[, waivers] do have the
advantage of putting an end to it. It’s peace of mind, nice to know
you’re not going to end up in two years arguing a 2255 [a collateral

111. Telephone Interview with Defender #5; see also Fant & Walker, supra note 53, at 60
(“Although courts have touted appellate waivers as providing additional bargaining power for
defendants during plea negotiations, the reality is that defendants have little power to refuse
prosecutors’ demands for appellate waivers.”); Telephone Interview with Defender #16 (“[T]he
government is not giving you more. I never had a case where the appeal waiver would make any
difference in the deal. That’s not an experience I’ve had. To me it is something they put in to
protect themselves from their own errors.”); Telephone Interview with Defender #7 (“[Q: Were
the deals better after appeal waivers? A:] No, they know in 95% of the cases there are no issues
to appeal. In my experience defendants in these cases have absolutely no bargaining power.”);
Telephone Interview with Defender #13 (“The reality is unless we had a bargaining chip we’d
have to go along.”); Telephone Interview with Defender #20 (“We didn’t ask [for benefits in
return for the waivers]. We didn’t consider the benefits would be better. There may be some
cases where we’re getting such a good deal that we would sign these, but not many.”);
Telephone Interview with Defender #4 (“[Q: What more would you get for the waiver? A:]
Nothing, really. Have to have an idea where your client will fall in the Guideline[s] range, have
to be right. If not, good luck withdrawing the plea.”).
112. Telephone Interview with Prosecutor #9.
113. Telephone Interview with Prosecutor #6.
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challenge, often based on ineffective assistance] . . . . It’s a harsh
114
reality, but there it is.”
Claims of ineffective assistance and misconduct by the
115
government may be excluded from waivers for this very reason.
Consider, for example, the provision discussed in United States v.
116
Robinson, which included this caveat:
provided however, . . . consistent with principles of professional
responsibility imposed on [defense] counsel and counsel for the
Government, [the defendant does] not waive his right to challenge
his sentence to the extent that it is the result of a violation of his
constitutional rights based on claims of ineffective assistance of
117
counsel or prosecutorial misconduct of constitutional dimension.

Of all agreements in our sample that included some sort of
waiver, only about 30 percent exempted ineffective assistance of
118
counsel claims. Of all defendants in the sample who signed waivers,
119
80 percent waived collateral review as well as appeal. Of those
defendants waiving collateral review, only 32 percent reserved the
right to raise ineffective assistance claims.120 Even fewer agreements
excluded prosecutorial misconduct claims from waivers.
This pattern might be related to early developments in appellate
case law on the enforcement of waivers. Several early decisions stated
that ineffective assistance of counsel claims could not be waived in
121
plea agreements, and some courts still adhere to this position.

114. Telephone Interview with Defender #21; see also Telephone Interview with Defender
#7 (“It is a lot easier to explain to the client [that] there are no issues when there is an appeal
waiver there.”). Defense attorneys do not escape appellate duties entirely when a client signs an
appeal waiver. See United States v. Garrett, 402 F.3d 1262, 1266–67 (10th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he
waiver does not foreclose all appellate review of [the] sentence. . . . If [the defendant] actually
asked counsel to perfect an appeal, and counsel ignored the request, [the defendant] will be
entitled to a delayed appeal.”).
115. Ineffective assistance claims are also the only claims exempted from the Attorney
General’s mandatory waiver for fast-track cases. See Fast-Track Memo, supra note 48, at 3
(“The defendant agrees to waive the opportunity to challenge his or her conviction under
[§ 2255], except on the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel.”).
116. 117 F. App’x 973 (5th Cir. 2004).
117. Id. at 974 (quoting the plea agreement).
118. See supra Table 9.
119. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
120. Of the 494 cases waiving collateral review, 158 exempted ineffective assistance claims.
121. E.g., United States v. Parra, 112 F. App’x 910, 911 (4th Cir. 2004) (per curiam)
(considering an appeal after the first appeal was remanded for fact-finding on counsel’s conduct,
despite a waiver); United States v. Carrion, 107 F. App’x 545, 546 (6th Cir. 2004) (reaching the
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Following Blakely and Booker, however, appellate panels have
enforced such waivers, so long as the claim of attorney error does not
involve advice about the plea agreement itself, but instead relates to
122
representation that occurred pre- or post-plea.
As the discussion above indicates, one concern with full blanket
waivers is that attorneys will not be as careful as they should be if
they know their past and future mistakes are protected from scrutiny.
Additionally, some defenders interviewed worried that waivers lead
judges to cut corners. Consider one defense attorney’s perception:
There are unjustified Guidelines enhancements that I fight about
with the judge, and you can see the judge, flipping back to the plea
agreement, making sure that the appeal waiver is there, then looking
you in the eye and denying everything. [Some] judges give
significantly shorter shrift to what are complicated close arguments

merits of a claim of ineffectiveness for failing to file an appeal despite an appeal waiver); see
also, e.g., Telephone Interview with Defender #17 (“I told one judge that he’d have to appoint a
separate counsel to advise the client before waiving that. He agreed [and] yelled at the
government, and they had to take it out. You know so much of federal court practice is peculiar
to the personality and views of individual district judges.”); supra note 68.
122. See, e.g., United States v. Jeronimo, 398 F.3d 1149, 1156 n.4 (9th Cir. 2005) (collecting
authority, but declining to decide the issue); United States v. Bowen, 121 F. App’x 569, 570 (5th
Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (enforcing an appeal waiver to bar a claim of ineffectiveness at
sentencing); Williams v. United States, 396 F.3d 1340, 1342 (11th Cir. 2005) (collecting authority
from Second, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits, holding that a waiver of the right to
challenge a sentence collaterally includes a waiver of the right to raise a claim of ineffective
assistance at sentencing, and noting that “a contrary result would permit a defendant to
circumvent the terms of the sentence-appeal waiver simply by recasting a challenge to his
sentence as a claim of ineffective assistance, thus rendering the waiver meaningless”); United
States v. Price, 113 F. App’x 374, 376 (10th Cir. 2004) (refusing, because of a waiver, to consider
a claim of ineffective assistance during the two weeks of trial before the defendant terminated
the trial by pleading guilty, reasoning that “none of the alleged errors Defendant cites pertain to
plea negotiations,” and that “poor previous trial performance [that] put [the defendant] in a
position in which a plea was simply the best option. . . . is not the sort of argument which
survives a waiver of post-conviction rights”); United States v. Monzon, 359 F.3d 110, 119 (2d
Cir. 2004) (enforcing an appeal waiver when the defendant raised an ineffectiveness claim,
noting that otherwise a defendant “could escape the fairly bargained-for appeal waiver by the
simple expedient of asserting an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim that had no merit”);
United States v. Cockerham, 237 F.3d 1179, 1187, 1188 (10th Cir. 2001) (concluding that
collateral attacks based on ineffective assistance of counsel claims that fall outside a challenge to
the validity of the plea or waiver are waivable, and finding that the defendant’s claim that
counsel was ineffective at sentencing did not relate to the validity of the plea or waiver); see also
Braxton v. United States, 358 F. Supp. 2d 497, 503 (W.D. Va. 2005) (“[M]otions claiming
ineffective assistance of counsel that do not relate directly to the validity of the plea or the
§ 2255 waiver itself are waivable.”).
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when they know they can’t be appealed. . . . It is not a good idea for
123
judges to know that they are insulated from appeal.

Another defender offered, “[L]et’s face it, [judges] didn’t want to be
124
reversed, [and] these waivers gave them a level of comfort.” Beyond
anecdote, however, our study cannot shed light on the effect, if any,
that appeal waivers might have on the level of care that judges devote
to sentencing decisions.
4. Illegal Sentences. It is also difficult to test critics’ warnings
that because of appeal waivers, serious error goes uncorrected.125
More than half of the defense attorneys interviewed reported that
some valid, nonfrivolous claims were turned away due to appeal
waivers. Attorneys reported that waivers had blocked Guidelines
issues concerning departures, ranges, and enhancements.126 “[T]he
defendant had a twin brother,” recalled one defender, “and there
were criminal history issues about whether the prior was related to
this defendant or his brother, but there was an appeal waiver.”127 Case

123. Telephone Interview with Defender #9; see also Telephone Interview with Defender
#14 (“Strategically, what we realized was that if a [Guidelines] issue arises at sentencing that was
not anticipated by the parties, especially criminal history (this happens a lot), the judge is
looking at the plea agreement that allows appeal by the government and not for the defense.
Who is he going to rule for to avoid appeal? It creates a built-in bias.”); Telephone Interview
with Defender #15 (“The [Pre-Sentence Report] comes in stamped ‘appeal waiver,’ and the
judges will see that and just refuse to listen to arguments. The judge has to pay more attention if
the appellate judges are looking over his shoulder.”). But cf. Telephone Interview with
Defender #4 (“One judge says that he’s going to err on the side of the defense, he’s not a liberal
soft judge, and resolve any close call in favor of the defendant because the defendant has no
appeal.”); Kate Stith, The Risk of Legal Error in Criminal Cases: Some Consequences of the
Asymmetry in the Right to Appeal, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 36 (1990) (arguing that “if the trial
court also seeks to avoid reversal, the prohibition on government appeal of acquittals provides
an incentive to make pro-defendant errors”); Steven Shavell, The Appeals Process and
Adjudicator Incentives 16 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper 10754, 2004),
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w10754 (“Where there is only one litigant who can
make an appeal, the appeals process fails to alter adjudicator decisions if they would favor that
litigant. Thus, the appeals process may have lower social value than where there are two
opposing litigants.”).
124. Telephone Interview with Defender #7. For other comments on acceptance of waivers
by trial judges, see supra note 54.
125. Carney, supra note 59, at 1032–33.
126. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Defender #19 (reporting that defendants waive
“scoring of enhancements, refusal to apply mitigators, [and] upward departures”); Telephone
Interview with Defender #21 (relating cases in which waiver barred defendants from raising a
double-counting problem and errors in calculating drug amount).
127. Telephone Interview with Defender #15. For another example, consider Telephone
Interview with Defender #14: “I’ve tried to get around [the waiver] and argue the exception
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law, too, suggests that the broadest waiver clauses bar claims that
128
129
certain penalties violate statutes or the Constitution. Because
those claims are not reviewed, however, it is not possible to
determine whether relief would have been appropriate absent the
waiver. And of course, the likelihood that sentences are based on
false “facts” is greater when trial and appellate judges alike abandon
scrutiny.
As just one example of the type of serious error insulated from
review by waivers, consider challenges to sentences under Apprendi
130
v. New Jersey, Blakely, or Booker. Ten circuits held that once a
defendant waives his right to appeal the sentence, that waiver blocks
any claim that the sentence violated his rights under the Fifth and
Sixth Amendments.131 Other courts have also expressed this view, but
as an alternative ground, or in cases that did not squarely present the

applies when the judge sentenced within the range that he calculated, but it was the wrong
range. Didn’t allow it.”
128. See, e.g., United States v. McAninch, 109 F. App’x 885, 886 (9th Cir. 2004) (declining to
address the defendant’s argument that a fine was authorized because “waiver includes the right
to appeal all the forms of punishment listed in that statute, including fines”); United States v.
Gomez-Perez, 215 F.3d 315, 319 (2d Cir. 2000) (appeal may be barred by a waiver even “where
the sentence was conceivably imposed in an illegal fashion or in violation of the Guidelines,
but . . . within the range contemplated in the plea agreement”). But cf. United States v. Gordon,
393 F.3d 1044, 1050 (9th Cir. 2004) (reviewing a restitution order alleged to be erroneous under
the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act, because if the restitution order is in excess of the
statutory maximum penalty, it is illegal and the waiver of appeal is inapplicable); Telephone
Interview with Defender #21 (“We can appeal an illegal sentence. Three years ago a judge
restricted a guy’s access to the [I]nternet and the court of appeals said [the sentence] was illegal
because the [probation] condition was bad. It’s a way around the waiver.”).
129. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 389 F.3d 944, 953 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that a waiver
barred the right to argue that facts should have been established by a clear and convincing
evidence standard).
130. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
131. United States v. Morgan, 406 F.3d 135, 138 (2d Cir. 2005); United States v. Lockett, 406
F.3d 207, 214 (3d Cir. 2005); United States v. Johnson, 410 F.3d 137, 153 (4th Cir. 2005); United
States v. Blick, 408 F.3d 162, 170–71 (4th Cir. 2005); United States v. Bond, 414 F.3d 542, 546
(5th Cir. 2005); United States v. McKinney, 406 F.3d 744, 746–47 (5th Cir. 2005); United States
v. Bradley, 400 F.3d 459, 463 (6th Cir. 2005); United States v. Bownes, 405 F.3d 634, 637 (7th
Cir. 2005); United States v. Parsons, 396 F.3d 1015, 1017–18 (8th Cir. 2005) (per curiam),
vacated on other grounds, 408 F.3d 519 (8th Cir. 2005); United States v. Cardenas, 405 F.3d 1046,
1048 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. Porter, 405 F.3d 1136, 1142–43 (10th Cir. 2005); United
States v. Grinard-Henry, 399 F.3d 1294, 1296 (11th Cir. 2005); United States v. Rubbo, 396 F.3d
1330, 1335 (11th Cir. 2005). But see United States v. Henderson, 135 F. App’x 858, 862–63 (6th
Cir. 2005) (finding that although the defendant expressly waived the right to challenge the
constitutionality of the Guidelines or the Guidelines sentence, Booker error was not waived,
and remanding for resentencing under an advisory system).
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132
issue. No circuit has expressly exempted claims under Blakely or
Booker from waivers.
If sentencing error remains uncorrected because of waiver
clauses, three types of harm may result. First, defendants barred by
their waivers from raising valid claims may be punished illegally in
violation of a statute or the Constitution—that is, punished more
severely than they otherwise would have been had they not signed
appeal waivers but had instead pursued appellate relief for the error
in their cases. However, many defendants receive significant
advantages by signing the waivers, advantages that for these
defendants might outweigh or exceed any potential relief that
133
preserving a valid claim might have yielded. By signing a waiver,
defendants gamble that the deals they have negotiated are better than
the dispositions they might ultimately receive if they preserved their
right to review. Some win this bet, others do not. Because not all
defendants barred from waiving a valid claim by their plea
agreements suffer as a result of the waiver, there is no basis for
claiming that waivers are, for example, more likely than not to lead to
excessive punishment for defendants. We simply do not know what
proportion of defendants end up worse off because of their waivers.
Second, gaps in enforcement created by appeal waivers pose an
additional risk unrelated to the interest of the defendant or the
prosecutor. If prosecutors are negotiating (and judges are approving)
lower sentences in cases with waivers to avoid the trouble of appeal,
the sentences that result may be more lenient than what either
Congress or the Commission had authorized. Defendants may be
receiving substantial sentencing discounts for a reason—to avoid

132. See United States v. Sahlin, 399 F.3d 27, 32–33 (1st Cir. 2005) (finding that the
defendant’s claim that the judge should have found the predicate facts for the enhancement by
proof beyond a reasonable doubt was foreclosed by stipulation to the application of the
enhancement); United States v. West, 392 F.3d 450, 460–61 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (rejecting a Blakely
claim and enforcing a waiver clause in the defendant’s plea agreement because the defendant
failed to provide a reason not to, but expressly declining to decide whether such waivers are
valid as a general matter).
133. Consider this explanation by Prosecutor #6:
Is it a contract of adhesion, is it unfair that we are demanding an awful lot but not
giving up much? Yes, you could argue that. But we don’t have to give up anything,
and as a matter of judicial efficiency it makes sense. Especially when the sentences
are high, who is to say that agreeing to 45 years instead of life is wrong or an
inappropriate punishment? And if you ask is the defendant benefiting from the
agreement, is it still, even with the waiver, an agreement that inures to the benefit of
the defendant in the end? Yeah, it is, that’s why they sign the agreement at all. Is
there a real benefit the defendant is getting? Yes.
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appeals—that neither Congress nor the Commission has endorsed as
a basis for imposing lower sentences. With so much attention devoted
to regulating unauthorized leniency under the Guidelines, it is rather
remarkable that the trading of sentencing discounts for appeal
waivers has gone unnoticed.
Finally, appeal waivers may also hide from view the extent of
uneven application of the law regulating the criminal process. When
appellate correction is bought and sold in some cases but not others,
Congress, the Commission, and the courts that develop and interpret
sentencing law are left with an incomplete picture of the extent and
frequency of compliance. This concern is addressed below in
Section 6.
5. Bargaining Savvy. Interviews turned up another interesting
pattern that has not been raised by current critics of appeal waivers.
Many interviewees reported that compared with less-experienced
attorneys, repeat players from federal defender offices get better
deals in return for waivers and are more likely to avoid waivers by
counseling their clients to reject plea agreements and plead guilty to
134
the indictment “blind.” Explained one defender:
The economics are quite different for the private and CJA attorneys
[attorneys appointed under the Criminal Justice Act]—they are
thrilled to have no appeal, because they won’t get paid for it, and the
CJA attorneys are trial attorneys at heart. They don’t relish appeals
either. The [United States Attorneys] will tell you they get waivers
in every case, and they are getting more of them in the cases
represented outside this office. . . . They backed down on the appeal
135
waiver [with us] but have made headway with the private lawyers.

134. See Telephone Interview with Defender #4 (“[T]he retained attorneys don’t know what
they are doing. . . . I’ve seen two occasions where the judge made the wrong ruling and the
defendant had no recourse . . . [T]hey were panel attorney cases.”).
135. Telephone Interview with Defender #19; see also Telephone Interview with Defender
#8 (“[Q: What percentage of plea agreements do you think have appeal waivers in your district?
A:] Two to five percent or so, no more, doesn’t happen that often. Private counsel do it all the
time. . . . They don’t know doodly about the Guidelines, they get a deal, they go for it. They
don’t realize [that] fewer charges doesn’t lower [the] sentence.”); Telephone Interview with
Defender #1 (“I know there are a lot of panel attorneys with less experience in the federal
system who are eating appeal waivers when they shouldn’t. They don’t have these waivers in the
state system.”); Telephone Interview with Defender #3 (“A fair number really don’t know what
they’re doing, don’t know if they are getting anything in return for the appeal waiver.”);
Telephone Interview with Defender #9 (“[T]he panel attorneys and private attorneys . . . [will]
sign anything, but my policy was if [you’re] not going to plead to a lesser, or [get] something in
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Several prosecutors confirmed that “repeat customers may be
more resistant than others. . . . [There are s]ome who bargain
136
harder.” Reported one prosecutor:
A CJA attorney will say, “[W]ell this is part of every plea
agreement, I might as well sign it, I’ve got to get ready for trial in my
civil case anyway.” Defenders are different. They have no other
sorts of cases. They look at these and say, “I can litigate this.” They
137
can give it more thought at the time.

Some defenders’ offices have even negotiated with the United States
Attorney in their districts to narrow the language in boilerplate
138
Unfortunately, information about whether a
appeal waivers.
defendant was represented by a federal defender, panel attorney, or
retained counsel was missing from the Commission data in 73 percent
of the cases in our sample, so we could not test the accuracy of
interviewees’ reports of better deals for those represented by federal
defenders.
That defense attorney savvy and influence might make a
difference is not exactly headline news. But it is a reminder that
variations in the quality of defense counsel will impede any system
that hopes to reduce, rather than exacerbate, disparity in sentencing
139
among similarly situated offenders.
6. Law Distortion. That brings us to the last objection to appeal
waivers—their potential to distort the law. Waivers may hide
violations of certain rules more often than violations of other rules,
hide violations in certain jurisdictions more often than in other
jurisdictions, and hide error in certain types of cases more often than

the deal, don’t sign the plea agreement.”); Telephone Interview with Defender #10 (stating that
his office will not sign agreements with waivers except in Rule 11(c)(1)(C) cases, and that “the
cases with waivers that did get to the courts were by panel attorneys”); Telephone Interview
with Defender #15 (“If they see one of these, they wouldn’t know what it was. We have more
understanding about these.”).
136. Telephone Interview with Prosecutor #1.
137. Telephone Interview with Prosecutor #6.
138. Telephone Interview with Defender #5.
139. A similar point is made by Professor Margareth Etienne, in her article, Parity,
Disparity, and Adversariality: First Principles of Sentencing, 58 STAN L. REV. 309, 321 (2005)
(“A tremendous knowledge gap currently exists between federal public defenders and private
lawyers, many of whom understand little about the intricate Guidelines. This knowledge gap . . .
leads to a disparity in sentencing outcomes among defendants. . . . [A] sentencing system that
unnecessarily magnifies these differences should be avoided.”).
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in other types of cases. All bargaining skews appellate lawmaking
because rules that survive the bargaining process receive attention
and development that rules waived as part of bargains do not. For
most legal rules, we accept that parties will bargain in the shadow of
the few cases that do reach judicial decision, and that some rules will
be enforced less vigorously in some cases than in others. But
sentencing rules are premised explicitly upon the goal of minimizing
disparity between cases. Blind spots of enforcement are more costly
when the very reason for the regulation being traded away
140
inconsistently is consistency itself.
Critics have worried that waivers hide from view bargaining
141
practices in some jurisdictions but not others. Even within the same
circuit, the proportion of cases with waivers varies greatly from
district to district. Table 10 shows the frequency of waivers for the
eight districts that had at least twenty cases in the sample. Cases
settled by plea agreement appear to be almost entirely insulated from
review in some districts, whereas in other districts appeal waivers are
the exception, not the rule. For example, our sample contained sixty
cases from each of two adjoining districts in Texas; in one district over
93 percent of the agreements had waivers; in the other only 30
percent did.
Given the marked differences in the use of waivers, it is likely
that the mix of sentencing issues that reach the courts of appeals from
the Southern District of California (with 5.4 percent of offenders, but
only 3.1 percent of appeals during FY 2003) might be different from
the mix that rises out of the Southern District of Texas (with 7.2
percent of offenders and 8.5 percent of appeals during FY 2003).
140. See United States v. Melancon, 972 F.2d 566, 570–80 (5th Cir. 1992) (Parker, J.,
concurring specially) (arguing that, like waiving the statutory right to a speedy trial, which
offends the goals of the Speedy Trial Act, waiving the right to sentencing in accordance with the
Guidelines offends the systematic goals reflected in the Guidelines); Nancy Jean King, Priceless
Process: Nonnegotiable Features of Criminal Litigation, 47 UCLA L. REV. 113, 132 (1999)
(“[R]egulating waiver makes sense as a means to protect public or third-party interests that are
advanced by the government’s adherence to procedural requirements. Regulation of the waiver
of a potentially nonnegotiable right must be tailored to the specific third-party or public
interests that the right protects.”); cf. Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 401 (1987)
(O’Connor, J., concurring in part and in the judgment, casting the fifth vote) (stating that the
enforcement of release-dismissal agreements, in which a defendant agrees to release authorities
from civil liability in return for dismissal of charges, requires proof that the agreement is in the
public interest). But cf. infra note 151.
141. See Telephone Interview with Defender #9 (“And the other thing that is bad is that
sentencing law in this circuit is made by cases out of [names a different location]. There are no
appeals from here.”).
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Unfortunately, without further analysis using appellate data, we do
not have enough information to attribute lower rates of appeal, or
differences in issues appealed, directly to higher rates of waiver.
Table 10. Districts with 20 or More Cases in Sample

District

% Cases
Of Cases
%
from
District
% Cases from
Of Cases from Dist. FY 2003, Appeals
with
Dist. Trafficking / In FY 2003, % Traf. % from FY 2003,
Dist.
from Dist.
Waivers Immigration (Total) / Immig. (Total)

P.R.

3.7%

74.1% / 3.7%
(77.8%)

64.6% / 9.0%
(73.6%)

1.2%

1.0%

E.D.N.Y.^

70.4%

48.1% / 7.4%
(55.5%)

42.9% / 6.7%
(49.6%)

2.7%

1.9%

S.D. Fla.

445.0%

62.5% / 7.5%
(70.0%)

43.5% / 19.7%
(63.2%)

3.3%

3.9%

S.D.
Tex.*^

30.0%

48.3% / 45.0%
(93.3%)

34.2% / 53.8%
(88.0%)

7.2%

8.5%

W.D. Tex*

93.3%

76.7% / 10.0%
(86.7%)

52.5% / 32.3%
(84.8%)

7.2%

6.7%

D. Ariz.*^

97.7%

13.3% / 62.5%
(75.5%)

21.2% / 53.4%
(74.6%)

6.5%

2.8%

C.D. Cal.*

95.7%

21.7% / 13.0%
(44.7%)

17.6% / 19.0%
(36.6%)

2.6%

4.6%

S.D.
Cal.*^

100.0%

35.1% / 56.8%
(91.9%)

28.3% / 54.2%
(82.5%)

5.4%

3.1%

* denotes fast-track immigration program.
^ denotes fast-track drug trafficking program.

142

Another concern is that waiver may insulate from review
sentencing issues for particular types of offenses. Because
Department of Justice policy mandates waivers for fast-track
dispositions, it is not surprising that immigration and drug trafficking
142. See generally Memorandum from James B. Comey, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, Authorization of Early Disposition Programs (Oct. 29, 2004), appended to
Government’s Memo, supra note 48 (listing districts with fast-track programs and describing
each program). Although the fast-track programs noted in Table 10 were officially authorized
during the sample period, many, like the fast track in the Southern District of California, had
been in existence for the entire sample period (FY 2003). After the sample period ended,
additional fast-track programs were approved for drug trafficking in the Western District of
Texas and for false immigration documents in the Southern District of Florida, but these are not
noted above. See id.
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cases appear more likely to contain waivers than the other two most
prevalent categories of federal felonies. Yet as Table 10
demonstrates, any pattern of waiver use that rises as the proportion of
immigration and drug cases rises is not uniform at the district level.
The likelihood of waivers does not appear to correspond directly to
the proportion of the district’s caseload devoted to drug trafficking or
immigration cases.
More importantly, based on 2003 data, the two offense categories
with the highest incidence of waivers in our sample—drug trafficking
and immigration—seem to make up a slightly larger proportion of the
143
appeals than they do cases sentenced. Fraud cases, with a waiver
rate lower than either trafficking or immigration, comprise a lower
proportion of appeals, not higher. This comparison of waiver rates
and appeals by district and offense type, although simplistic, fails to
support claims of waiver critics that waivers are choking off review for
entire districts or types of offenses.
Table 11. Waivers and Appeals by Crime Type
Crime Type

Of Sample Cases of Of Cases FY 2003, Of Appeals FY 2003,
Type, % with Waiver % of This Type
% of Type

Drug Trafficking

62.3%

35.7%

41.4%

Fraud

60.4%

10.7%

8.2%

Immigration

71.6%

21.6%

22.1%

Firearms

53.7%

9.8%

10.5%

Note: Source for data in last two columns is Commission FY 2003 Statistical Report,
Tables 3 and 61.

A final concern has been that waivers are essentially one-sided,
which leads to another sort of distortion in the development of
144
appellate sentencing law. As Table 12 shows, we found that very
145
few waivers are mutual. This has not, however, translated into a
143. See infra Table 11.
144. See, e.g., United States v. Raynor, 989 F. Supp. 43, 46 (D.D.C. 1997) (stating that
unilateral waivers “undermine the statutory balance” created when both sides were given access
to appellate review).
145. However, not all trial judges allow one-sided waivers, according to some interviewees.
See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Defender #6 (“[O]ne case where the United States tried to
get one without waiving itself, and [the judge] rejected [it], order[ed] them to do it over.”);
Telephone Interview with Defender #13 (“After [the new United States attorney] came in [one
assistant U.S. attorney] started asking for waivers by the defendant with no waiver by [the]
government. [The] judge refused to accept it.”). Compare United States v. Calderon, 388 F.3d
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change in the balance between defense- and government-initiated
sentencing appeals. Government appeals have always been few and
far between compared to defense appeals; this disparity may be
partially explained by the requirement that prosecutors seek
146
supervisory approval prior to any appeal.
Table 12. Party Waiving
% Cases with Waiver (n=616)
Defendant Only

87.0% (536)

Defendant & United States

12.5%* (77)

United States Only

0.5% (3)

* Of these 77 cases, 19 (24.4 percent) are from the Central District of
California and 8 (10.2 percent) are from the District of Arizona. No other district
with 20 or more cases in our sample had mutual waivers.

Based on this limited study, the safest conclusion to draw about
the distorting influence of waivers on the development of sentencing
doctrine in the courts of appeals is that we have not seen evidence
that waivers have changed the balance of appeals between parties.
Nor does this study support the conclusion that waivers have
precluded appeals by defendants convicted of certain offenses or
from certain districts. Waivers may affect the issues that appeals
courts address, but we cannot confirm or refute this without
additional research.
CONCLUSION
Appeal waivers are firmly entrenched in plea agreement practice
in federal courts. By adopting deferential reasonableness review, the
Court in Booker has reduced the value of appeal waivers to
prosecutors. But waivers still hold value and are not likely to fade
away. Already the language of clauses in some districts has been
changed to respond to the new post-Booker regime by including an
express waiver of review for reasonableness.147 More importantly,

197, 200 (6th Cir. 2004) (rejecting an argument that enforcing a defense waiver in light of the
government’s right to appeal was unfair) with United States v. Blick, 408 F.3d 162, 168 n.5 (4th
Cir. 2005) (noting an earlier decision holding that whenever a defendant waives the right to
appeal in a plea agreement, the government has a reciprocal obligation not to appeal).
146. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(b) (2000).
147. Prosecutor #4 commented:
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waivers are proving their worth to prosecutors by deflecting Booker
148
claims on appeal, and they will continue to insulate sentences from
attack should the Court later expand the Apprendi rule to include
findings of prior convictions or facts necessary to mandatory
minimum sentences, consecutive sentences, forfeitures, or restitution
orders.149 With the constitutional regulation of sentencing statutes
uncertain, prosecutors and courts will turn to appeal waivers to
maximize finality.
Rather than count on appellate review as a means of assuring
consistent application of sentencing law, reformers should assume
that in most felony cases in which the parties enter into agreements,
appellate review of the sentence is simply not available. At best,
appellate review enforces sentencing consistency in only a minority of
federal cases—cases that go to trial, cases in which the defendant
pleads open with no agreement, and cases in which the defendant is
able to resist signing an appeal waiver. At worst, widespread
bargaining over waivers has turned appellate review into a bargaining
chip, increasing, rather than decreasing, sentencing disparity.
Appellate review is as likely to be traded for sentencing concessions
as it is to deter or correct sentencing error. Reform should go
forward, then, with serious skepticism about the ability of appellate
review to ensure consistent sentencing practices.
The obvious question is whether it makes sense to regulate the
exchange of waivers for charge and sentence concessions. At least
two options present themselves, each with its own drawbacks. The
first alternative would be for courts to refuse to enforce waivers on

[D]istrict judges are putting pressure on the Department of Justice to get the
defendant to agree that any sentence within the Guidelines is reasonable. . . . It would
make some sense to include a stipulation that the sentence is a reasonable sentence
for all purposes under 3553(a)—a Booker waiver, but we aren’t doing that. We’d have
to decide whether a defendant could waive the constitutional rule in Booker. It’s the
next logical step. We do see some judges asking for this.
Another prosecutor reported that each agreement now includes a clause which reads, “The
defendant and the United States agree that any sentence that falls within the appropriate
Guidelines range, as determined by the probation office, . . . is per se reasonable and not an
abuse of discretion.” Telephone Interview with Prosecutor #6.
148. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
149. See, e.g., United States v. Fruchter, 411 F.3d 377, 382 (2d Cir. 2005) (collecting
authority rejecting the application of Apprendi and Blakely to criminal forfeiture); see also
Brian Kleinhaus, Note, Serving Two Masters: Evaluating the Criminal or Civil Nature of the
VWPA and MVRA Through the Lens of the Ex Post Facto Clause, the Abatement Doctrine, and
the Sixth Amendment, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2711, 2755–59 (2005) (discussing application of
Blakely to restitution).
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policy grounds. Prohibition would maximize the goal of sentencing
consistency; once deprived of value, waivers would cease to be
traded. The interest in maximizing the uniformity of sentences for
like offenders is not represented by the attorneys at the bargaining
table in criminal cases. If sentencing law is to trump the preferences
of parties, and not merely to serve as an opening bid, then courts
must enforce it, despite waiver. Policy must serve as the basis for
refusal to enforce waivers, because at present any constitutional or
statutory prohibition of waivers is unlikely. The Court’s precedent is
not likely to support a constitutional ban on the waiver of sentencing
appeals. If a defendant can waive the right to a jury trial, then surely,
proponents have argued, defendants can choose to waive statutory
150
rights to appellate review of their sentences. To read current federal
statutes as prohibiting waivers is also a stretch.151
Of course, as Congress considers new sentencing legislation in
the wake of Booker, it could choose to mandate appellate review of
152
every sentence, or prohibit appeal waivers entirely, but it would be
difficult for legislators to deny prosecutors and courts the finality and
fiscal relief that appeal waivers afford. Already, Congress has opted
for efficiency over consistency in authorizing fast-track programs, for
example. For waiver proponents, banning waivers would mean
abandoning a handy way to encourage the speedy disposition of
criminal cases, regardless of whether the ban is based in constitutional
law, statutory command, or sentencing policy. There is no easy
solution to reconciling the efficient administration of justice with the
need to ensure uniform sentencing, but the need for such
reconciliation will continue to be at the very heart of sentencing
policy for years to come.

150. See cases collected supra note 46.
151. See New York v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110, 117 (2000) (upholding the waiver of the Interstate
Agreement on Detainers (IAD) timing provisions and noting that (1) the Court has allowed the
waiver of numerous constitutional protections for criminal defendants that also serve broader
social interests; (2) in general, those social or public interests are protected by the participants in
the litigation; and (3) the time provisions of the IAD are not so central to the statute that they
are “part of the unalterable ‘statutory policy’“). In supporting its conclusion that the provisions
of the IAD may be waived, the Court in Hill also pointed out that unlike the time limits of the
Speedy Trial Act, which run automatically without request of the defendant, IAD time limits
are triggered only by a request of one of the parties. Id. at 117 n.2. Notably, appellate review of
noncapital sentencing also requires a request of one of the parties.
152. Professor Chanenson has suggested that “Congress should statutorily eliminate
sentence appeal waivers.” Steven L. Chanenson, Guidance From Above and Beyond, 58 STAN.
L. REV. 175, 182 (2005).
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An entirely different approach to regulating this market would
be to attempt to standardize the price of appeal waivers instead of
driving that price to zero. Critics might observe that efforts to
standardize another process discount—the sentencing break
defendants receive for waiving trial—have not been particularly
successful.153 Parties continue to set the price of a trial higher than (or
the discount for a plea deeper than) the three points allocated by the
Guidelines for acceptance of responsibility whenever they have the
leverage to do so.154 And it is the absence of any enforceable ceiling
on the penalty gap between plea sentences and trial sentences that
most troubles commentators, who worry that even an innocent
defendant will plead guilty and accept a moderate penalty rather than
risk conviction and a sentence many times greater. A similar inability
to constrain the amount of discount would plague any attempt by
Congress or the Commission to set a price for appeal waivers.
Yet even though the Guidelines have been ineffective in setting a
ceiling on the price of the waiver of trial, they have changed
bargaining by setting a floor—an opening bid. The waiver of appeal
presently has no similar pricing norm deliberately selected as part of
nationwide policy. Some defendants who waive review rights get
nothing in return. It is possible, then, that simply recognizing a going
rate might have some tendency to improve the consistency of federal
sentencing.
Inevitably, though, any minimum, legislatively endorsed price tag
on the right to appeal would be challenged as an unconstitutional
penalty on the exercise of the statutory rights to direct and collateral
review.155 The Guidelines plea discount—“acceptance of
responsibility”—has withstood constitutional challenge as a trial
penalty because it is easy to justify as related to the purposes of
punishment and sentencing philosophy. Pleading guilty can be recast

153. See, e.g., Nancy J. King et al., When Process Affects Punishment: Differences in
Sentences After Guilty Plea, Bench Trial, and Jury Trial in Five Guidelines States, 105 COLUM. L.
REV. 959, 961 n.4 (2005) (collecting authority).
154. See FIFTEEN-YEAR REPORT, supra note 15, at 30 (“Department [of Justice] policies
allow prosecutors to invoke statutory minimum penalties and statutory enhancements as further
incentives for guilty pleas, even barring their declination or dismissal except as part of a plea
agreement.”).
155. Although there is no constitutional right to appeal, the Supreme Court has held that
imposing a higher sentence as a penalty for exercising the right to appeal violates due process.
See, e.g., LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 13, at § 26.8 (discussing North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S.
711 (1969), and the cases that followed).
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as feeling guilty without raising too many eyebrows, and a defendant
who feels guilty is arguably in need of less punishment than one who
denies his responsibility for the crime and demands that the
government prove his guilt. Even snitches who receive lesser
sentences for helping to prosecute others are arguably exhibiting a
greater earnestness about becoming law-abiding citizens than those
156
who could rat on their pals but choose not to. By contrast,
defendants who waive all of their rights to seek appellate correction
of any future constitutional and statutory errors that may occur at
sentencing are no less culpable or easier to rehabilitate than
defendants who do not waive these rights. Defendants who receive
discounts for appeal waivers may simply be opportunists, sacrificing
whatever the prosecutor wants (here, a free pass on any future law
violations) so long as it means less punishment.
These are only a few of the issues policymakers will encounter as
they consider how to take account of the increasingly pervasive use of
appeal waivers in federal cases. A full evaluation of the various
options for regulating waivers is beyond the scope of this initial
157
study. But hopefully, that evaluation will no longer be based entirely
on blind speculation about what waivers say, who signs them, in what
cases, and for what concessions. Ideally, the glimpse into appeal
waiver practice provided by this limited study will not be the last, and
the Commission will begin to collect basic information about appeal
waivers and their effects on federal sentencing.
Even if the Commission continues to ignore waivers in its data
collection practices, there are reasons to expect that scholars will soon
begin to fill the void. A new rule has been proposed that will require
all districts (not just a handful of pilot districts) to post all unsealed
documents filed in criminal cases on PACER, the searchable online

156. See Stephanos Bibas & Richard A. Bierschbach, Integrating Remorse and Apology into
Criminal Procedure, 114 YALE L.J., 85, 135 (discussing “the moral side of cooperation”).
157. Other creative proposals exist, including the suggestion that groups of defendants
coordinate their bargaining positions to gain leverage, like unions. See Donald A. Dripps,
Overcriminalization, Discretion, Waiver: A Survey of Possible Exit Strategies, 109 PENN ST. L.
REV. 1155, 1177–79 (2005) (discussing strategies for limiting the defendant’s right to waiver).
Indeed, as illustrated by some of the interviewees’ comments, see supra notes 135–138 and
accompanying text, some federal defender offices have been able to negotiate default waiver
policies applicable to all the defendants represented by the office, using leverage that private
defenders lack.
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158
Internet access to actual plea
database for federal courts.
agreements in federal cases nationwide has the potential to support a
new generation of empirical evaluation of bargaining practices.159
Finally, although this study has evaluated waivers of review in
federal cases, there are lessons here for the states. As states consider
more rigorous appellate review of increasingly detailed sentencing
rules, the experience in the federal system should furnish a cautionary
tale. The more closely that sentencing is regulated by appeal, the
more likely it is that appellate review will be traded as part of plea
negotiations, creating an additional source of sentencing disparity
between those who are able to extract sentencing concessions for
waivers, and those who are not.

158. Memorandum from Professor Sara Sun Beale, Consultant, to Members, Criminal Rules
Advisory Comm., Proposed New Rule 49.1, to Implement E-Government Act (Mar. 15, 2005)
(on file with the Duke Law Journal).
159. PACER research will always be an imperfect substitute for Commission analysis,
however, because only the Commission has access to the case identification information that can
link information from PACER to the detailed sentencing information coded into the
Commission’s many data sets (which are unavailable on PACER itself). The PACER database
is available online at http://pacer.psc.uscourts.gov/.

